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CHECKS AND BALANCES IN WARTIME:
AMERICAN, BRITISH AND ISRAELI
EXPERIENCES
Stephen J. Schulhofer*
Three years after an attack that traumatized the nation and
prompted massive military and law-enforcement counter-measures,
we continue to wrestle with the central dilemma of the rule of law.
Which is more to be feared - the danger of unchecked executive and
military power, or the danger of terrorist attacks that only an
unconstrained executive could prevent?
Posed in varying configurations, the question has already
generated extensive litigation since September 1 1 , 2001 , and a dozen
major appellate rulings.1 Last Term's Supreme Court trilogy
Rasul
v. Bush, 2 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld3 and Rumsfeld v. Padilla4
clarified
several important points but deferred decision on most of the
significant issues. Ever cautious and understandably daunted, the
Court avoided grappling in any final way with the underlying problem
of reconciling the benefits and dangers of constraints on executive
power. The problem, of course, is inherent in government itself. But in
-

-

*
Robert B. McKay Professor of Law, New York Universit y. A.B. 1964, Princet on;
LL.B. 1967, Harvard. - Ed.
T his essay is written to honor t he achievement s and cont ribut ions of an ext raordinary
t eacher and colleagu e, Professor Yale Kamisar. For forty-seven years - almost half a
centu ry! - Professor Kamisar has been an eloquent voice for t ruth and fairness in American
criminal ju st ice. He has inspired, and infu sed wit h hi s passion, several generations of
stu dent s, pract icing lawyers, ju dges and scholars. Long before we met , I was indebt ed to his
penet rat ing scholarship, and for me, as for cou nt less ot her academics, he has been an always
generou s and t hou ght fu l t eacher. His inst ru ment al role in paving t he way for Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), one of t he most significant landmark s in American legal
hist ory, can never be t oo oft en ack nowledged. I congratu lat e t he Michigan Law Review for
choosing t o offer t his well-deserved t ribut e t o one of t he great legal figures of ou r t imes.
I owe thanks to Phillip Alst on, Eyal Benvenisti, Oli vier D eSchutter, Conor Geart y,
Richard Goldst one, Nico Keijzer and Yigal Mersel for comment s and help wit h foreign
sou rces, and t o Hallie Goldblatt for resou rcefu l research assist ance.

1. In addit ion to t he Su preme Cou rt decisions cit ed infra not es 2-4 and t he appellat e
decisions reviewed t herein, see, f or example, United States v. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292 (4t h
Cir. 2004); Ctr. for Nat'[ Sec. Studies v. Dep't ofJustice, 331 F.3d 918 (D .C. Cir. 2003); In re
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int elligence Su rveillance Cou rt of Review 2002); New
Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002); D et roit Free Press v. Ashcroft ,
303 F.3d 681 (6t h Cir. 2002).
2. 124 S. Ct . 2686 (2004).
3. 124 S. Ct . 2633 (2004).
4. 124 S . Ct . 2711 (2004).
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a national emergency it arises in less familiar settings, with much
higher stakes and more difficult choices that will bedevil us, m
changing forms, as long as the "war on terrorism" continues.
Beyond the legal specifics of last Term's trilogy (questions of
jurisdiction, venue, the reach of prior holdings and the meaning of key
statutory phrases), the cases presented a wide range of operational
questions. Does the President, acting as Commander in Chief, have
the right to hold suspected enemy fighters indefinitely, without
providing them any sort of trial? Should he be able to block their
access to lawyers, family and friends for lengthy periods, in order to
facilitate effective interrogation? If hearings or trials are required,
how promptly must they be held? Can the President choose to provide
hearings, but only before military commissions subordinate to his
authority? Can the public and even the defendants themselves be
denied access to crucial but sensitive evidence that military or civilian
judges will consider? If such Presidential powers exist, is Congress
barred from limiting their exercise? Can Congress and the press be
denied access to information about how the Presidential war powers
are exercised?
The Court seemed to answer the first question in the negative, but
the Administration continues to dispute this most elementary point.5
And even if the Court did mean what it explicitly said - that some
kind of hearing is required6 - it left every one of the remaining
questions wide open. To resolve them, of course, will require attention
to many legal particulars. But all the questions pose a common
normative problem - whether the need to protect public safety and
national security in a time of crisis justifies restrictions on liberty that
we would not impose under ordinary circumstances. Setting aside the
appropriate, but ultimately unsatisfying debate over the true meaning
of statutes and precedents, is there any way to resolve this
foundational issue as a matter of first principles?
After September 1 1 , 2001, many said that executive abuse was far
less likely and less harmful than a devastating attack that unhampered
executive officials could prevent. Others said, with equal confidence,
that unchecked executive power is always too dangerous, and is
inefficient to boot. It seems unlikely that either of these categorical
answers could be correct. The dangers of an insufficiently constrained

5. See Lyle Denniston, The Incredible Shrinking Rasul Decision, (July 31, 2004), at
http://www.goldsteinhowe.com/blog/archive/2004_ 07_ 25_ SCOTUSblog.cfm; Neil A. Lewis,
New Fight On Guantanamo Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2004, at Al8.
6. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648-49 (plurality opinion) (discussing hearing rights of U.S.
citizens); cf Rasul, 124 U.S. at 2698 n. 15 (noting for non-citizens that their allegatio ns
" unquestionably" describe custody in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States and therefore, if true, would unquestionably entitle them to release).
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executive and the dangers of an overly constrained executive are both
real. A central constitutional issue of our time will be to determine
which is the more serious - and when.
America's past experience in wartime provides one relevant
benchmark. But it cannot be decisive in itself. Fighting terrorism poses
challenges that are essentially new (or newly recognized) for America.
For that reason, it is worth considering the experience of Western
democracies that confronted grave terrorist threats over extended
periods before September 11, 2001. The focus of this Article,
therefore, is an examination of the extent to which two of these
nations, Britain and Israel, relaxed their own rule-of-law norms in
order to battle terrorism effectively during periods of grave danger. It
goes without saying that crisis situations abroad, such as the violence
Britain faced in Northern Ireland, are not in all respects comparable
to the terrorist threat America faces today. And the value judgments
and compromises struck in other nations, even in comparable
situations, are not necessarily right for the United States. But the
British and Israeli situations, both extending over several decades,
offer two of the few available sources of recent experience in
attempting to reconcile the demands of national survival and the rule
of law in the context of an unremitting terrorist threat.
Part I of this Article summarizes recent Administration assertions
of executive detention power and the arguments advanced in support
of them. Part II briefly outlines the history of executive detention in
previous American wars and the often-overlooked pattern of judicial
insistence on preserving rule-of-law norms. Part III examines British
and Israeli efforts to reconcile those norms with a persistent terrorist
threat.
The conclusions, summarized in Part IV, indicate that in both
Britain and Israel, executive and military authorities claimed
extraordinary powers and sought to dilute normal judicial checks. In
both nations, such measures provoked controversy, and other
branches reined them in to some extent. In these respects the foreign
experience mirrors that of the United States over the past three years.
There is, however, a dramatic difference in the degree to which
adjustments were made. In the current American "war on terrorism,''
the Administration has - with considerable support in the courts and
even more in public opinion - held suspected terrorists
incommunicado for several years, on nothing more than a unilateral
Presidential determination of their involvement. The recent Supreme
Court decisions, while refusing to condone unlimited Presidential
power, set few clear boundaries. In one of the three cases (Hamdi),
the Court held only that after more than two years, there was no
longer sufficient justification for continued incommunicado detention;
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it found no need to specify whether the rights to counsel and a hearing
kick in at any earlier point.7 In the other two cases, the Court left
general principles even less specific. And despite encouraging rhetoric,
the Court gave no immediate relief to any of the individual
petitioners; their two-year-plus detentions were left undisturbed, and
the government insists that even now, most of them have no right of
access to counsel.8
The counter-terrorism adjustments sought and accepted in other
countries differ by many large orders of magnitude. In Northern
Ireland, beginning in the early 1970s, rival Catholic and Protestant
militants resorted to increasingly lethal bombings and shootings in an
effort to terrorize opposing communities; as Britain struggled to cope
with a staggering death toll among security forces and civilians,
ordinary time limits for bringing detainees to court, varying from
twenty-four to thirty-six hours, were extended to seven days. Israel has
for years confronted persistent suicide bombings and other terror
attacks that its citizens consider a grave threat to national survival; in
response, Israel raised its normal time limit prior to judicial review of
detention from twenty-four hours to forty-eight hours for suspected
terrorists seized within Israel itself, and to eighteen days for unlawful
combatants captured in territories under military occupation. These
measures, though modest (and arguably trivial) compared to those
now imposed in the United States, were nonetheless perceived as
draconian. Courts insisted that they be scaled back. In Israel, periods
exceeding eight days for combatants seized in occupied territories
were held to be an unacceptable impairment of the rule of law. In
Britain, detention up to a maximum of seven days was allowed only
with assurance that incommunicado conditions would end after forty
eight hours.
Access to counsel was likewise modified, but in ways that again
seem almost trivial in comparison to American practice post
September 11th. In Britain, access to counsel in terrorism cases was
restricted during the first forty-eight hours of detention, but
restrictions were subject to judicial review, and there was (and is) an
absolute, judicially enforceable right to consult a solicitor after the
forty-eight hour point. In Israel, access to counsel (normally
immediate) can be deferred in terrorism investigations for up to

7. See Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2652 (plurality opinion). Indeed, a grudging reading of Hamdi
would leave room for the government to argue that incommunicado detention exceeding
two years might sometimes be permissible, depending on all the circumstances.

8. Since July 2004, the government has all owed Padilla to have unmonitored meetings
with his attorneys. T elephone interview with Andrew Patel, counsel to Padilla, Sept. 28,
2004.
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twenty-one days, but only with judicial approval and with some
detainee access to family and other outside contact in the interim.
Beyond imposing these basic checks, courts abroad have addressed
many of the difficult practical details that the U.S. Supreme Court has
yet to confront. Both the British and Israeli terrorism crises required
courts to decide how much allowance to make for the need - as part
of effective intelligence gathering - for isolation and extended
interrogation of terror suspects. In both situations courts assessed the
procedural safeguards, structural independence, and limits on
confidentiality appropriate in judicial review of detention decisions.
They examined the safeguards necessary to prevent abuse of terror
suspects in custody and the leeway warranted in light of legitimate
national-security concerns. Israeli courts have considered the impact
of logistics and administrative resources on the processing of enemy
combatants seized in battle. Most fundamentally, both situations
prompted extensive assessment of the nature of the judicial role and
the appropriate mix of deference and scrutiny when courts face claims
of military necessity in the context of the gravest threats to public
safety and national survival.
On all these matters, detailed below, courts abroad assumed a
large role in reviewing, reassessing and restraining executive and
military powers.
These judgments by themselves cannot prove that greater
executive power would have been ineffective or too dangerous. It is
always possible that with more power, British and Israeli authorities
would have prevented more terror attacks, just as it is possible that
more power would have backfired in any number of ways. But in one
important respect the British and Israeli experiences are
unambiguous. They leave us with no illusion that powers currently
claimed by the U.S. government are in any sense normal, even for a
situation of national crisis. Those who urge extraordinary judicial
deference to the Commander in Chief and a highly limited role for the
courts bear the burden of explaining why we should reject wartime
checks and balances that we ourselves, along with other Western
democracies, have until now considered essential and entirely
workable components of the rule of law.
I.

EXECUT I VE DETE NT ION S INCE SE PTE MBE R

11, 2001

The U.S. government has asserted broad powers of executive
detention in three contexts. First are the hundreds of foreign nationals
seized abroad and held outside U.S. borders. Second are the U.S.
citizens seized abroad; the government held one of them (Yaser
Hamdi) in military custody in the United States for more than two
years without access to any court. Third are those arrested by law
enforcement agents within the United States and subsequently
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transferred to military custody. Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen suspected
of plotting to detonate a bomb laced with radioactive material, was
arrested at O'Hare Airport in May 2002 and originally held as a
material witness. In June 2002, a day before his scheduled appearance
in court, President Bush declared Padilla an "enemy combatant" and
transferred him to the military, which has held him in a Navy brig ever
since. Ali Saleh al-Marri, a citizen of Qatar lawfully studying in the
United States, was arrested in Illinois in December 2002 and charged
with lying to the FBI. Although the Speedy Trial Act9 required al
Marri's trial to commence promptly after indictment, in June 2003
President Bush designated al-Marri an enemy combatant, and he too
was turned over to the military and moved to the same Navy brig.
Though the legal arguments vary for the different groups of
detainees, the government claimed the same powers in all three
situations - the power to resolve factual questions and determine the
person's status by Presidential order, based on intelligence reports,
without any hearing or opportunity for the detainee to respond;10 the
power to hold the person indefinitely, with the likelihood that in most
cases this will mean detention for many years;11 the power to deny all
access to counsel or the courts; and the power to deny the detainee
any contact whatsoever with the outside world, for as long as the
military, in its sole discretion, considers advisable.12
Government arguments for its position are in part stated simply as
a matter of power. The claim (much contested) is that prior precedent
and the President's authority as Commander in Chief give the
executive the right to take these steps when it judges proper, without
need to answer to any other branch of government. The policy
considerations advanced in support boil down to three problems
allegedly entailed in any sort of outside involvement or adversary
hearing. The potential need for testimony from combat commanders
could, it is said, impede battlefield operations. The inevitable
disclosure of information about the identity of detainees and the basis
for the suspicions against them could, it is said, provide our enemies
9. 18 u.s.c. §§ 3161-74 (2000).
10. At oral argu ment in Hamdi, the government argu ed that the det ainee h ad the
opportunit y t o respond to the allegat ions against him by t elling his side of the st ory to h is
int errogat or. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct . at 2651 (plu ralit y opinion), dismissing th at argu ment as
fatu ou s ("An int errogation by one's capt or, h owever effect ive as an int elligence gathering
t ool, h ardly constitut es a const itut ionally adequ ate fact finding bef ore a neut ral decision
maker.").
11. See, e.g. , Neil A. Lewis & Eric Sch mitt , Cuba Detentions May Last Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at Al.
12. See Linda Greenhou se, Court Hears Case On U.S. Detainees, NEW YORK TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2004, p. Al; Michael Killian & Lisa Anderson, U.S. To Let Padilla See Lawyer,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE Feb. 12, 2004, p. 1.
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with clues about intelligence methods and the direction of our
counter-measures. Finally, questioning of suspected terrorists could, it
is said, be impeded unless interrogators are able to keep suspects
isolated and make clear to them that they remain completely
dependent on their captors.13
In Rumsfeld v. Padilla,14 the Court considered these claims in the
context where they seem weakest - that of a U.S. citizen arrested
within the United States and held in custody on American soil.15 Yet
the Court, dividing 5-4, ordered that Padilla's habeas petition be
dismissed. The majority expressed no view on the issues of
presidential power or on what rights, if any, Padilla might have. It
simply held that he had filed his petition in the wrong jurisdiction.
After more than two years of detention, virtually all of it
incommunicado, and after persistent, unsuccessful efforts to secure the
rights to counsel and to a hearing on the allegations against him,
Padilla obtained no relief whatever. He was told to start over again in
another court.
Rasul v. Bush,16 at the opposite pole, involved foreign nationals
seized during combat operations in Afghanistan and held outside U.S.
territory, at the Guantanamo Bay naval base. A World War II
precedent, Johnson v. Eisentrager,17 which ruled that German
nationals held in an American military prison in occupied Germany
had no right to seek habeas corpus relief in the federal courts, posed
an especially large obstacle to relief in Rasul. Nonetheless, the Court,
dividing 6-3, found Eisentrager inapplicable and upheld the district
court's jurisdiction to hear the foreigners' petitions. The Court did not,
however, express any view on what proceedings, if any, would be
appropriate on remand.18
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,19 the detainee, also captured in
Afghanistan, was a U.S. citizen now held in the United States, and
jurisdiction was undisputed. Here a controlling plurality of the Court

13. Decla ra tion of Vice Admi ral Lowell E. Jacoby at 4, Pa dilla v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct.
1353 (2004) (No. 03-1027).
14. 124 s. Ct. 271 1 (2004).
15. The Second Circuit ha d hel d tha t Pa dilla wa s entitl ed to immedia te rel ease under
the terms of the Anti-Detention Act, 18 U .S.C. § 400l(a) (2000), which provides tha t "(n]o
citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise deta ined by the United Sta tes except pursua nt to a n
Act o f Congress."
16. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
17. 339 U .S. 763 (1950).
18. "Whether a nd wha t further proceedings ma y become necessary a fter respondents
ma ke their response to the merits of petitioners' cla ims a re ma tters tha t we need not a ddress
now." Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699.
19. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
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did reach the merits,20 and it settled three points. First, it upheld the
President's power to hold for an extended period (at least until the
end of active combat operations) the so-called enemy combatants those who have taken up arms against the United States and our
allies.21 Second, rejecting the government's assertion that separation
of-powers principles mandated a "heavily circumscribed role for the
courts,"22 it held that a citizen classified as an enemy combatant has a
constitutional right to a hearing before an independent tribunal to
resolve any dispute about the facts allegedly supporting that
designation.23 And third, without reaching Hamdi's complaints about
earlier government actions denying him access to counsel, it held that
" [h]e unquestionably has the right to access to counsel in connection
with the proceedings on remand."24
The list of issues the Court did not resolve is long:
(1) Regarding those who are in fact enemy combatants, the Court
did not decide what rights, if any, they might have while in
confinement. 25
(2) It did not decide whether enemy combatants could be confined
indefinitely in the event that overseas military operations against
terror networks take on a quasi-permanent character.26
(3) It did not decide whether enemy combatants could be confined
indefinitely on the basis of a diffuse "war on terrorism" not tethered
to active combat operations abroad.
20. Justice O'Conn or's plurality opinion was join ed by Chief Justice Rehnquist an d
Justices Kennedy an d Breyer. Four Justices (Souter , Gin sburg, Scalia an d Steven s) would
have gr an ted the government far less leeway, but on e (Thomas) would have granted the
governmen t more. The lin e-up thus provides majority support (eight votes) for requiremen ts
at least as significan t as those Justice O' Connor supported but not for anythin g beyon d
those. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
21. Id. at 2639 (plurality opinion ).
22. Id. at 2650.
23. More precisely, the Court held that the detain ee has (at some un specified poin t) the
right to n otice of the factual basis for his classifi cation as an en emy combatant, an d a " fair
opportunity" to rebut the govern ment's factual claims before a "n eutral decision maker"; it
rejected as in adequate the governmen t's position that its burden of supporting the en emy
combatan t design ation could be met merely by producin g " some eviden ce." Id. at 2648,
2651 .
24. Hamdi, 124 S . Ct. a t 2652 (plurality opin ion ) .
25. By implication , however, the Court has probably ruled out (at least un der existin g
statutes) the prospect of in definite con fin emen t in communicado, as it said that " [c]ertainly,
we agree that in definite detention for the purpose of in terrogation is n ot authorized." Id. at
2641.
26. W hile noting the con vention al un derstan din g permittin g detention of prison ers of
war un til the con clusion of hostilities, the Court in terestin gly observed that "[i)f the practical
circumstances of a given conflict [with respect to its duration ] are en tirely unlike those of the
con flicts that in formed the developmen t of the law of war, that un derstan din g may unravel."
Id. at 2641.
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(4) Regarding those who dispute their status as enemy combatants,
the Court did not decide what rights, if any, they must be afforded
during the period before they are removed from the zone of combat.27
(5) It did not decide how soon after removal from the combat zone
the right to a hearing arises.
(6) It did not decide what acts, other than participation in armed
conflict against U.S. or allied military forces would be sufficient to
j ustify classification as an enemy combatant.28
(7) Beyond the three core safeguards that must always be
respected in cases of factual dispute (notice, a fair opportunity to
rebut factual allegations, and a neutral decisionmaker), the Court did
not decide the kind of tribunal, the procedural safeguards, and the
burden of proof that due process requires. The plurality, beneath its
nominally noncommittal language,29 did send a strong signal that it
would allow hearsay evidence, a rebuttable presumption in favor of
the government, and a military tribunal like ones that Army
Regulations already contemplate.30 Yet it remains uncertain whether
and under what circumstances the Court as a whole will accept
measures of that sort. Four justices rejected such measures explicitly,31
and the plurality did not focus on their implications in any detail.
(8) The Court did not decide what procedures must be followed in
the case of persons seized outside a zone of active combat - and in
particular to U.S. citizens seized within the United States. Although
such persons undoubtedly are now entitled, at a minimum, to the due
process rights available in a case of battlefield seizure (Hamdi), the
question whether such persons are entitled to more, either as a matter
of statute32 or constitutional due process, was expressly left open.33

27. Id. at 2649 ("[I]nitial captures on the battlefield need not receive the process we
have discussed here. " ).
28. The Court addressed only the "narrow category" of " individuals who fought against
the United States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban," Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640, and
expressly excluded consideration of other situations that the government might classify as
sufficient to support an enemy-combatant designation. Id. at 2639.
29. "[T] he exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside fr om these core
elements, enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon
potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict. Hearsay, for
example, may need to be accepted . . . . " Id. at 2649 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 2651 (referring, as illustrative of an acceptably neutral forum, to the tribunals
authorized by Army Regulation 190-8 § 1-6 (1997)). Similarly, with respect to the
admissibility of hearsay (and thus the concomitant restriction on the detainee' s ability to
cross-examine witnesses against him) " a habeas court in a case such as this may accept
affidavit evidence . . . . " See id. at 2652.
31. Id. at 2653 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 2660-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000).
33. Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2639 (plurality opinion).
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On all these matters, the Court evidently remains troubled by
arguments suggesting an imperative need for deference to the
government, that an overly intrusive judicial process may impede
time-sensitive operations, interfere with the interrogation of suspects,
compromise sources and methods of intelligence, and disclose
important secrets. Arguments of this nature are not incoherent. The
problems they suggest, however unlikely in specific contexts, are
perfectly plausible in others. The principal objection to such claims is
not that they are factually implausible but that the benefits of judicial
deference come at a potentially staggering cost - placing individual
liberty in the hands of a single person, the Commander in Chief, and
dangerously weakening the checks on this form of executive power. If
we wish to ask, as a matter of first principles, whether the rule of law
really pays its way in this context, the answer cannot come from logic
or rigorous empirical proof; we can rely only on practical judgment,
guided by the uncertain lessons of past and present experience.
II.

THE HIST ORY

Contrary to the contemporary conventional wisdom,34 judges in
previous wars did not place the president's powers as Commander in
Chief wholly beyond judicial scrutiny. The history has been explored
in detail elsewhere,35 but the highlights should be mentioned. The
history includes many instances of unwarranted judicial deference and
a frequent pattern of invalidating emergency powers only after the
crisis had passed.36 Some of these episodes we have subsequently
acknowledged to be shameful mistakes. Congress did so formally and
explicitly in the case of the World War II Japanese internments.37 But
on other occasions, courts reviewed presidential claims of military
necessity and held them insufficient to override constitutional rights.
In particular, Ex parte Milligan,38 Ex parte Endo39 and Duncan v.
Kahanamoku40 all insisted that military power to detain civilians (or
34. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Civil Liberties After 9111, COMMENTARY, July-Aug. 200 3,
at 29-35; Ruth W edgwood, The Rule of Law and the War on Terror, N.Y. nMES, Dec. 23,
2003, at A27.
35. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Fred Korematsu, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534
(2003) (Mem.) (No. 03-334); DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003); STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WI THIN 7- 10 (2002).
36. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
WARTIME (1998).
37. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Fred Korematsu, supra note 35, at 18-21.
38. 71 U.S. (4 W all.) 2 (1866).
39. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
40. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
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those who claimed to be civilians) within the United States must
remain subordinate to the Article III courts and the safeguards of the
Bill of Rights. Stressing a powerful presumption against extrajudicial
deprivation of liberty, the Court in Endo held that legislation and
Executive Orders governing the removal of Japanese-Americans from
the West Coast - though upheld in Korematsu v. United States41
authorized removal only and could not be interpreted to authorize
detention.42 Invoking the same presumption, the Court in Duncan held
that Congress's approval of "martial law" in Hawaii during World
War II could not be read to authorize the trial of civilians in military
courts.43
Indeed, contemporary rhetoric has drastically distorted the original
conception of the Commander in Chief's role. President Bush is
sometimes introduced to civilian audiences as "our Commander in
Chief," and in cases like Padilla the Administration has sought to
invoke Commander-in-Chief powers to support presidential authority
to detain erstwhile civilians accused of involvement with the enemy.
Yet as Justice Jackson put it, "the Constitution did not contemplate
that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will
constitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its industries
and its inhabitants."44 Article II's Commander-in-Chief clause was
unmistakably designed to place the military under civilian control, not
to place civilians under military control.
In short, j udicial decisions consistently reflected two judgments:
that even under wartime conditions, protection against the risk of
unjust incarceration required the robust procedural safeguards of the
Bill of Rights; and that threats to national security, even when
convincing, could be less important than the dangers of overreaching
by a well-intentioned but overzealous executive branch. Thus, the
unreviewable executive power claimed after September 11 cannot be
viewed as the Administration's defenders have often portrayed it, as a
routine practice sanctioned by long-standing tradition. The Hamdi
plurality accurately described the history in reminding us that "a state
of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the
rights of the Nation's citizens," and that even in wartime "unless
Congress acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus [assures]
an important judicial check on the Executive's discretion in the realm
of detentions."45
-

41. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
42. Endo, 323 U.S. at 300-01.
43. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 322-23.
44. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643-44 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring opini on).

45. Hamdi, 124 S.Ct. at 2650, 2648, 2650 (plurali ty opini on).
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Yet even as they were rejected, the Administration's forceful
claims for unchecked power decisively shifted the terms of the debate.
The Hamdi plurality apparently felt it could vindicate traditional due
process norms merely by requiring "some system" for challenging
executive judgments;46 its instinct for seeking a middle ground left the
plurality predisposed to compromise. It assumed that ordinary
safeguards ought to be diluted simply because interests out of the
ordinary were implicated. If that approach ultimately commands a
majority of the Court, the outcome will fall far short of one insisting,
as did such decisions as Milligan and Kahanamoku, on complete Fifth
and Sixth Amendment guarantees in fully independent Article III
courts. Whatever the ground on which one might defend such an
approach, it represents a significant departure from the predominant
pattern of wartime American courts.
III.

CO NTE MPORARY C OUNTE R-TE RRORI SM ME A SU RE S AB ROAD

This Section confronts the principal reason why checks and
balances preserved in previous wars might be considered too
dangerous to preserve now - the concern that modern terrorists pose
significantly different challenges. Since the 1970s many nations have
faced persistent problems of terrorism.47 Some instances, in Germany,
Italy and France, were troublesome but never seriously threatened the
established regime. In contrast, Basque separatist terrorism in Spain
and Kurdish separatist terrorism in Turkey were (and remain)
entrenched, serious threats to the public order and territorial integrity
of those nations. This section examines the two cases that are probably
the most severe and the most relevant to American traditions of due
process - the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the problem of violence
in Northern Ireland.
The foreign experience shows a trend that might surprise many
Americans. In the mid-1960s due-process requirements proliferated in
America, far beyond anything familiar in other countries. Critics of
this development often looked to Europe for confirmation that
Western nations could respect liberty and democratic values without
saddling themselves with the Warren Court's elaborate scheme of
46. Id. at 265 1 .
47. Definitions o f terrorism are notoriously difficult and politic ally c harged. For present
purposes it is suffic ient to acc ept the decidedly non-neutral perspec tive of the threatened
nation itself. W e are c onc ern ed with identifying the extent to whic h offic ials c ommitted to
the politic al status quo c onsider independent c hec ks and balanc es tolerable - and important
to pr eserve - even when fac ing severe c hallenges to their authority. For our purposes,
therefore, terrorism is any organized effort to kill public offic ials or c ivilians for purposes of
making a politic al statement, striking fear in the population, or undermining the authority of
the established government.
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safeguards.48 The next three decades saw two seemingly contradictory
developments in Europe. First, public order deteriorated dramatically,
not only because of rising crime, but also because many European
countries experienced persistent terrorism. Second, over the same
period when public safety and even the stability of several European
states was increasingly threatened, European community institutions
began to elaborate restrictive rules to control police power. By the
1990s, the nations of Western Europe found themselves subject, just as
we are, to a detailed, constitutionally mandated "code of criminal
procedure." Even in the context of emergency counter-terrorism
measures, the European nations now accept the enforcement of this
code by independent, unelected judges, nearly all of whom are not
even nationals of the countries against which they render their
decisions.
The Israeli pattern is similar. Courts developed constitutional
norms much like those of their European counterparts. Over the
period since 1999, in which the Palestinian intifada has grown in
intensity, one might expect that Israeli courts would have become
increasingly deferential to military and administrative authorities. In
fact, the opposite has occurred; in terrorism cases, Israeli courts have
become increasingly interventionist.
The resulting European and Israeli norms cannot by themselves
establish the meaning of due process in our own constitution. But they
seem entitled to considerable weight where, as here, they in no way
argue for departure from our own settled standards,49 but instead
suggest that the traditional American commitment to judicial review,
largely respected in our previous wars, remains equally applicable to
our current circumstances.
A. Israel
1.

The Context

Israel's security problems are well known. From the moment of its
founding in 1948, it has been in a formal state of war and often in
active military operations against nations on its borders. In addition, it
has confronted uprisings against its occupation forces in the West
Bank and Gaza (including the intifadas of 1987 and 2000 to present)
and has been the frequent target of lethal suicide bombings and other
terror attacks against civilian targets in the population centers of Israel

48. See, e.g. , Miran da v. Arizon a, 384 U.S. 436, 522 (1966) (Harlan , J., dissenting)
(referrin g to the En glish " Judges' Rules").
49. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), where the Court drew on
decision s of the European Court of Human Rights to guide the in terpretation of our due
process clause an d to support its con clusi on that on e of its own prior decisions was wron g.
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itself. Such attacks have caused enormous numbers of casualties and
widespread disruption and fear in ordinary civilian life. Most Israelis
believe that terrorist organizations responsible for these attacks "have
set Israel's annihilation as their goal,"50 and that national survival
requires the strongest possible antiterrorism responses. Nonetheless,
Israeli law embodies a strong system of judicial checks in national
security cases. And paradoxically, as suicide attacks in Israel and
terrorism worldwide have intensified, those checks have become
increasingly robust.
2.

The Legal Framework

Given the grave threats to Israeli security, it is not surprising that
Israeli law-enforcement powers have been supplemented with special
tools, and for terrorism investigations, many ordinary safeguards have
been suspended from the beginning. Under Israel's Basic Law, all laws
restricting personal freedom must "compl[y] with the ethical values of
the State of Israel . . . [and] not exceed necessity. "51 When regulations
- including military regulations - infringe upon basic liberties in a
manner that is "not proportionate," they are deemed
unconstitutional.52

50. H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Again st Torture in Israel v. State of Israel, 53(4)
P.D. 817.
51. Basic Law: Human Digni ty an d Freedom, 1992, S.H. 1391, art. 8, in ISRAEL'S
WRITIEN CONSTITUTION (3d ed. 1999). Al though Israel has yet to adopt a formal
con stitution , on many matters of " con stitution al sign ificance" its legislature has en acted
" Basic Laws" - " en actmen ts, which stan d above other Laws an d whi ch gen erally can be
adopted, amen ded or repealed on ly by a special majority." Aryeh Green field,
" In troduction ," in id., at 4.
The "Basic Law: Human Dign ity an d Freedom" was adopted on ly in 1992, but lon g
before then , the Israel Supreme Court had developed a substan tial body o f quasi
con stitution al law, " fashion [in g] the law of human rights out of whole cloth," and " creat[in g]
a de facto system of judicial review in Israel that is quite similar to that employed by courts
possessin g the power to review primary legislation ." Stephen Goldstein , The Protection of
Human Rights by Judges: The Israeli Experience, in JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: MYTH OR REALITY (M. Gibn ey & S. Frankowski, eds. 1999) at 55, 60. As early as
1949, the Israel Supreme Court held that " every person i s en dowed with a n atural right [ of
liberty] ," id., at 59, an d accordin gly that executive regulations (the primary source of law in
Israel) cann ot restrict in dividual freedoms, in the absence of specifi c authorizin g legislation .
W here such legislation existed, the court held that ambiguous terms should be con strued as
n ot restricting in dividual liberty, id., an d that if the legislature in ten ded to restrict liberty " it
had to do so very explicitly, " id., at 61, even in the absence of an applicable Basic Law.
W here Basic Laws do apply, moreover, the Israel Supreme Court has " held that these Basic
Laws have n ormative supremacy over ordin ary laws an d that the Court, therefore, may
in validate ordin ary laws that are in confl ict with them." Id., at 56.
52. H.C. 3239/02, Marab v. IDF Comman der in the W est Bank, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 26
(Isr.). For cases arisin g in the occupied territories, ordin ary Israeli laws (in cluding Basic
Laws) are techn ically n ot applicable. But military regulations that infrin ge on basic liberties
can n on etheless be ruled un constitution al. For the occupied territories, the court applies the
same prin ciples that it applied within Israel durin g the period prior to adoption of the " Basic
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In ordinary criminal proceedings, a suspect must be brought to
court and a judge must approve the basis for detention within twenty
four hours of arrest.53 But these requirements are qualified by a formal
state of emergency that has been in force continuously since 1948.
Indeed, even before independence, the B ritish Mandate adopted
special antiterrorism authority
the Defense (Emergency)
Regulations (DER) of 1945. The DER granted the British High
Commissioner broad, largely unreviewable discretion to demolish the
homes of those considered responsible for terrorist attacks and to
detain anyone whose detention was judged "necessary or expedient
for maintaining public order or securing public safety or state
security. "54
From 1945 to 1948, the British used these powers mainly against
the terror tactics of the Jewish underground. But the DER, along with
other laws of the British Mandate period, remained in effect after
statehood, and for decades it provided the framework for Israeli
security measures. When Israeli forces occupied the West Bank and
Gaza after 1967, the DER framework was applied there as well.55
Nonetheless, with its grant of virtually unlimited executive and
military powers, the DER was considered incompatible with the rule
of law, and in 1979 Israel replaced it with a more limited regime, the
Emergency Powers (Detention) Law (EPDL).
The EPDL addresses the principal accountability concerns that
arise in connection with detention: the duration of detention, access to
counsel, access to the courts, and their role. The U.S. government, as
we have seen, claims the legitimacy of, and the need for, unchecked
executive power in all these respects; the Hamdi plurality, unwilling to
go that far, nonetheless was disposed to accept extended detention
and a vastly reduced role for j udicial review. The EPDL is
considerably less sweeping. It allows the Minister of Defense to issue
an order of detention whenever he "has reasonable cause to believe
that reasons of state Security or public security require that a
particular person be detained. "56 A detainee can then be held for a

Law: Human Dign ity an d Freedom" in 1992, an d these prin ciples are in all practical respects
iden tical to those that the Basic Law requires. See n ote 5 1 , supra.
53. See id.; Eliahu Ham on & Alex Stein , Israel, in CR I MI NAL PROCEDURE: A
WORLDWIDE STUDY 217, 221-22, 226 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999).
54. Eman uel Gross, Human Rights, Terrorism and the Problem of Administrative
Detention in Israel: Does a Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terrorists as Bargaining
Chips?, 18 ARIZ . J. INT'L & COMP. L. 721 , 755 (2001) (hereinafter Gross/].
55. Th e Israeli military exten ded the DER provision s to the occupied territories in 1967,
but the Israel Supreme Court subsequen tly ruled that in an y even t, those provisions (along
with other law of the Man date period) had remain ed in effect on the West Ban k throughout
the 1948-1967 period of Jordan ian rule. Gross I, supra n ote 54, at 756 & n.145.
56. Gross I, supra n ote 54, at 725.

August 2004)

Checks and Balances in Wartime

1921

maximum of forty-eight hours (double the period allowed in
conventional criminal cases) , by which time the detention order must
be submitted to a judge.57 If the court finds no reasonable basis for
detention, or if the judge concludes that there are alternative means to
meet the state's security needs, the detainee must be released. If the
detention order is upheld, a judge must review and approve it again
every three months. Detainees have the rights to access counsel after
forty-eight hours (or in terrorism cases, after a maximum of twenty
one days and subject to judicial review58), to know the reason for
detention (unless a judge finds that the information would jeopardize
security), and to be present in court for all legal proceedings (unless a
judge finds that State security requires otherwise).59
Occupation authorities operating in the West Bank and Gaza have
more flexibility. But even in that context, military authorities and the
occupation administration remain subject to judicial oversight. For
both suspected terrorists and ordinary criminal defendants, Order 378,
adopted in 1970, allowed detention prior to judicial review in occupied
territories for up to eighteen days, on the basis of an officer's
"reasonable reason [sic] to believe that a crime has been committed."60
But following the 1988 report of an official commission, the detention
period prior to the judicial hearing was shortened to eight days for all
categories of suspects detained in the occupied territories.61 With
respect to the right to counsel, terrorism suspects and ordinary
defendants face different regimes. Under Order 378, access to counsel
for ordinary criminal defendants is normally not impeded.62 In
contrast, for defendants suspected of violating security laws, Order 378
57. A similar forty- eight-hour li mit applies in the case of Israeli soldiers facing the
possibility of charges un der military law. Israel' s Military Justice Law-1955 allowed for
detention for up to n in ety-six hours before the suspect had to be brought before a military
judge. But the Israeli Supreme Court held this period excessive an d therefore
uncon stitution al; subsequen tly the MJL was amen ded to provide that a soldier detain ed
un der the MJL must be brought before a judge within forty-eight hours. Gross I, supra n ote
54, at 726; see also Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 20.
58. See Ham on & Stein , supra n ote 53, at 234.
59. Gross I, supra n ote 54, at 756.
60. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 29 (citin g Order Con cernin g Secur ity Provisions, No.
378, 5730 - 1970 (Apr. 20, 1970) [herein after Order 378)).
61. See Symposium, The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of
Investigation of the General Security Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist A ctivity, 23 ISRAEL
L. REV. (Sprin g-Summer 1989). Un der Order 378, a more restrictive regime applied to
"admin istrative" deten tion n ot tied to a con ven tion al crimin al in vestigation . In such cases
detention prior to judicial review was limited to ninety-six hours. See Marab, 57 (2) P.O . 349
para. 29, f or a discussion of Order 378, section 87B(a). But a subsequent provision Military
Order 1226, adopted in 1988, exten ded admin istrative deten tion to eight days as well. See id.
paras. 5, 29.
62. The law makes provision for delayin g access to coun sel un der certain cir cumstan ces
f or a few hours an d in exception al cases, for up to nin ety-six hours. See id. para. 37.

1922

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 102:1906

originally permitted denial of access to counsel for as long as thirty
days in the occupied territories.63
In 2002, intensive terrorist attacks and large-scale military
operations on the West Bank prompted changes in this regime. In
March 2002 the Israel Defense Forces ("IDF") launched Operation
Defensive Wall ("ODW"), in which Israeli troops and heavy armor
moved into areas of the West Bank previously under the
administration of the Palestinian Authority. The operation sought to
move Israeli troops into West Bank cities where militant terrorist cells
were based, to arrest wanted persons hiding there, and more generally
to sweep up suspected members of terrorist organizations. By May
2002, the IDF had detained about 7000 persons in connection with
Operation Defensive Wall. After initial screening, many of these
detainees were quickly released, while others were moved to
detention facilities and held for further investigation. By May 15, 2002,
more than 5000 of the detainees had been released, and 1600
remained in detention.
The initial detention and screenings were carried out within the
framework of Order 378, but it soon became apparent that the IDF
was far from complying with its requirements, in particular the
requirement that detainees be brought to court within eight days. To
regularize the situation, the Israeli military promulgated a new
detention regime on April 5, 2002. The new regulation, Order 1500,
allowed detention for up to eighteen days of anyone seized in West
Bank military operations, based solely on an IDF officer's
determination that "the circumstances of [the person's] detention raise
the suspicion that he endangers or may be a danger to the security of
the area, the IDF, or the public."64 Order 1500 allowed the detainee to
protest to military authorities within eight days, but made no provision
for court appearance or judicial review until the end of the eighteen
day period.65 In addition, Order 1500 barred all ODW detainees from
meeting with a lawyer at any point during the eighteen-day period and
allowed for denying access to counsel on a case-by-case basis for an
additional fifteen-day period. Isolation from counsel was thus possible
for a total of thirty-three days (compared to the maximum thirty-day
period allowed under the prior Order 378 regime).
Order 1500 was to remain in effect only for two months, but as
IDF operations continued on the West Bank, the special detention
63. Order 378 allowed the head of the inves tigation to bar access to a lawy er for a
period of u p to fifteen days, and a reviewi ng administrator was granted the authority to
extend that bar for an additional fifteen days if convi nced that the measure is "necess ary for
the s ecurity of the area or for the benefit of the investigati on." See id.
64. Marab, 57 (2) P.O. 349 para. 3.
65. At that point, if the military s ought further detention, it was required to s eek judicial
approval under the Order 378 procedu re.
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regime was extended twice and remained in effect until January 2003.
After the initial two-month period, however, the length of detention
prior to judicial review was shortened to twelve days66, and the period
of automatic isolation from counsel was shortened first to four days
and later to two. Including the authority to deny access to counsel on a
case-by-case basis under Order 378, the maximum period of isolation
from counsel varied from thirty-two to thirty-four days.67 Detainees
were not held completely incommunicado, however. As soon as they
were removed from the zone of combat to a detention facility, which
occurred within forty-eight hours, they had the right to be visited by
representatives of the International Red Cross, and their families were
informed of their whereabouts.68
3.

The Judicial Role

Prior to adoption of the EPDL, there was little opportunity for
judicial review, and for many years following its adoption, Israeli
courts proceeded cautiously; they almost invariably deferred to the
judgment of the military authorities.69 Judicial attitudes began to
change in the early 1990s, as the Israeli Supreme Court progressively
dismantled various doctrinal barriers to judicial review, such as
standing and j usticiability,70 and showed itself increasingly willing to
question claims of military necessity. The court's current attitude,
summarized by its chief justice, is simply that "everything is
justiciable. "71
The judicial role in detention hearings has evolved accordingly.
Initially, factual review was highly deferential; it was said that the
court should determine only whether the military judgment was
reasonable.72 More recently, virtually all deference has disappeared
from the standard of judicial review, at least in theory. In the Israeli

66. See Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 6, for a discussion of Order 1505.
67. Id. para. 6, 39-40.
68. Id. para. 46.
69. Gross I, supra note 54, at 758, 759.
70. Stephen Golds tein, The Protection of Human Rights by Judges: The Israeli
Experience, in JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MYTH OR REALITY? 55 (Mark
Gibney & Stanis law Frankows ki eds ., 1999); Gross I, supra note 54, at 758, 759; see Marab,
57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 46 ("[U]nder our approach to the iss ue of s tanding, any pers on or
organization interes ted in the fate of a detainee may [appeal to the High Court of Jus tice in
a petition agains t their detention].").
71. Gross I, supra note 54, at 758 (quoting H.C. 1635/90, Zharzhevs ki v. Prime Minis ter,
48(1) P.D. 749, 855-57).
72. Id. at 759 & n.166 (s tating that "a court mus t examine the reasonableness of the
decis ion to iss ue the order").
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conception, a detention hearing is not a review of an executive
decision; rather, detention is seen as a judicial act:
The judge does not ask himself whether a reasonable police officer
would have been permitted to carry out the detention. The judge asks
himself whether, in his opinion, there are sufficient investigative
materials to support the continuation of the detention.
. . . Judicial detention is the norm, while detention by one who is not a
judge is the exception.73

Of course, detainees seized on a battlefield fall squarely within the
exception. In such situations, however, the detention must be brought
within the normal judicial framework as soon as possible. Hence, even
when a detention occurs in the course of a military operation, the
judge's role (in theory) remains one of making a de novo decision, not
one of reviewing for "reasonableness" the decision of a field
commander.74
Detention need not be supported by prima facie evidence of guilt;
the judge need only find "reasonable suspicion that the detainee
committed a security crime and reasonable reason [sic) to presume
that his release will disturb security or the investigation."75 The
decisions frame this test as a demanding one. The evidence must show
that the detainee would "almost certainly" pose a danger and must
indicate a situation "so grave as to leave no choice."76 In its most
recent pronouncements, the Israeli Supreme Court has used language
suggesting an especially stringent approach:
[J]udicial review should [not] be superficial. . . . [A judge must] "ensure
that every piece of evidence connected to the matter at hand be
submitted to him. Judges should never allow quantity to affect either
quality or the extent of the judicial examination. . . . Depriving one of his
liberty . . . is a severe step which the law only allows for in circumstances
which demand that such be done for overwhelming reasons of
security . . . . [The] security needs [must] have no other reasonable
solution. "77

73. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 32.
74. " [Even when] the initial detention is done without a judicial order . . . everything
possible should be done to rapidly pass the investigation over to the regular uudicial) track,
placing the detention in the hands of a judge and not an investigator." Id.
75. Id. para. 33.
76. Gross I, supra note 54, at 763 (emphasis omitted). The law is silent on the burden of
proof that must be met to support detention, but the commentators assume that the State
must establish the required elements by "clear and convincing evidence." Gross I, supra note
54, at 773; Emanuel Gross, Human Rights in Administrative Proceedings: A Quest for
Appropriate Evidentiary Standards, 31 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 215 (2001).
77. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 33 (quoting H.C. 253/88, Sajadia v. Minister of Defense,
42(3) P.D. 801 , 820, 821 (Shamgar, P.)).
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Nonetheless, it would be easy to exaggerate the intrusiveness of
judicial review and its practical significance. Evidentiary standards are
more flexible in detention hearings than in criminal cases; they may be
comparable to those that the Hamdi plurality seemed prepared to
accept for evidence adduced to support battlefield seizures.78 And
where security concerns warrant, judges can withhold evidence from
the defense and review it in camera. In such cases, the judge generally
will consider only written testimony and therefore will be unable to
assess credibility.79 Commentators have expressed concern that such
situations may lead to miscarriages of justice and incarceration of the
innocent.80
Moreover, judicial detention rulings in terrorism cases are
independent in theory but highly deferential in fact; Israeli courts
rarely release suspects detained by the IDF or the security services.
But judges do review the evidentiary basis for detention and do not
function simply as rubber stamps.81 And in a number of high-visibility
decisions, the Israeli Supreme Court, rejecting claims of military
necessity, has struck down important security measures as violative of
civil liberties. Three of these cases are worth mentioning to give a
sense of the judicial role in high-stakes situations. The first two, the
interrogation-methods case and the bargaining-chip case, have already
received some attention in the United States and can be summarized
briefly. The last case, recently decided, is worth extended discussion
because it deals directly with a problem now in the forefront of
American litigation, the detention of alleged unlawful combatants.
4.

Interrogation

In a 1999 decision, the Israeli Supreme Court barred the Israeli
security services from using certain harsh techniques of interrogation,
such as sleep deprivation and "shaking."82 The court ruled that Israel's

78. See supra Section I. When an Israeli court decides to deviate from the rules of
evidence it must state its reasons for doing so; and hearsay can be given weight only if it has
"evidentiary value." Gross I, supra note 54, at 762, 773 & n.181.
79. Gross I, supra note 54, at 761.
80. Gross I, supra note 54, at 762 & n.185.
81. See Goldstein, supra note 51 at 62, noting the "increased willingness of the High
Court of Justice to challenge the factual and legal correctness of governmental assertions of
'security interests.' " Likewise Gross I, supra note 54, at 758-61, notes that Israeli courts no
longer refrain from intervening in detention decisions and that judicial review, though
"inherently weak," id., at 761, does examine the length of detention and the evidentiary basis
for it; Israeli courts sometimes shorten the period of detention, and they have denied
military commanders the authority to re-extend a detention once a court has shortened it,
id., at 761 & n. 177.
82. Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, para. 24.
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Basic Law prohibits torture, inhuman treatment, and "any degrading
handling whatsoever."83 Moreover, the court stressed, the prohibition
is absolute; no exceptions are permissible, even when - as the
security services insisted - such techniques would help elicit
information necessary to thwart a terrorist attack. Though
acknowledging "the difficult reality in which Israel finds herself
securitywise," the court concluded:
This is the destiny of a democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it
and not all practices employed by its enemies are open before it.
Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its
back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the Rule of Law and
recognition of an individual's liberty constitutes an important component
in its understanding of security. At the end of the day, they [add to] its
strength.84

5.

Bargaining Chips

Between 1986 and 1987, a number of Lebanese citizens were
captured and convicted of acts of terrorism against Israeli forces. After
the Lebanese had served their sentences, many were held under
EPDL detention orders. In 1994, when an Israeli aviator was shot
down over Lebanon and captured by a local terrorist group, the Israeli
government hoped to obtain his release in exchange for the Lebanese
prisoners. But first it had to reconfirm its power to hold them, by
extending detention orders that were about to expire. In its petition to
renew the detentions, the government did not argue that these
prisoners posed a direct threat to national security. Rather, it insisted
that because the Lebanese could be exchanged for the captured
aviator, their detention for purposes of the negotiation met the EPDL
standard that "reasons of State security or public security require that
a particular person be detained. "85
The Israeli Supreme Court initially agreed with that view. But after
sharp criticism from civil liberties advocates,86 the court granted
rehearing and reversed itself. The chief justice (who had also authored
the previous decision ruling the other way) reasoned that although the
EPDL standard was "sufficiently broad to embrace events where the
danger . . . did not ensue from the particular person himself," that
conclusion was merely "the first stage" in the process of statutory
construction.87 The court held that because democratic principles

83. Id. para. 23.
84. Id. para. 39.
85. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law § 2. 1979, S.H. 76.
86. See Gross I, supra note 54, at 729.
87. See id. at 726.
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guide legal interpretation, the EPDL must be deemed to have dual
goals, preservation of both State security and "the basic values of
dignity and freedom vested in every person. "88 In striking that balance,
the court ruled that a person could be detained only if that person
himself posed a threat to the state. The aviator's family, along with a
sizeable segment of public opinion, was infuriated, but this time the
court rejected petitions for further rehearing and stood by its decision
ordering the release of the Lebanese.
6.

Detaining Unlawful Combatants

The most recent litigation testing Israeli checks and balances
involved a challenge to the army' s new procedures for detaining
alleged "unlawful combatants" during military sweeps that began in
March 2002.89 The new regime (Order 1500) changed the "normal"
West Bank regulations (Order 378) in three important respects. The
period of detention without judicial review was extended from eight
days to eighteen, access to counsel was barred for the entire eighteen
day period, and the army's obligation to initiate its investigation was
deferred for eight days.
The Israeli military defended these measures with national
security arguments similar to those advanced to support the enemy
combatant detentions in the United States: the need to defer to
military judgments made during combat, the difficulty of establishing
crucial facts, the importance of time for a successful interrogation, and
the need to protect confidential sources. The IDF insisted that the
chaotic military situation in West Bank towns and refugee camps
made it impossible investigate suspected PLO and Hamas fighters in
the immediate wake of their capture. Terrorists had intermingled with
civilians "without bearing any symbols that would identify them as
members of combating forces and distinguish them from the civilian
population, in utter violation of the laws of warfare."90 Moreover
investigation was time consuming because of "lack of cooperation on
the part of those being investigated and their attempts to hide their
identities"91; in many instances the IDF was unable to ascertain even
their names. Thus, the IDF argued, "it is pointless to bring detainees
before a judge, when they have not yet been identified, and the
investigative material against them has not yet undergone the
88. Gross I, supra note 54, at 726.
89. For discussion of the background of these new procedures, see supra text
accompanying notes 64-68.
90. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 31 (quoting IDF Response Brief para. 51 (May 15,
2002)).
91. Id. para. 31 (quoting IDF Response Brief para. 62 (June 11, 2002)).
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necessary processing"; a shorter time frame would simply force the
release of many dangerous detainees.92
The Israeli military did not suggest (as has the U.S. Government)
that these conditions justify indefinite confinement with no access to
courts at all. The IDF argued only that such circumstances support
delay for an additional ten days before bringing enemy combatants to
court. The Hamdi plurality, confronting similar problems, suggested
no time frame for removing detainees from the battlefield or allowing
them to contest their classifications.93 It expressed no impatience and
showed no evident discomfort with the two-year-plus periods that
detentions had been all0wed to remain unreviewed.
The Israeli Supreme Court, in contrast, found the military
arguments insufficient to support even a ten-day delay in judicial
intervention. The court struck down major parts of the regulations and
imposed its normal standards of judicial oversight. The court's central
premise was that " Ll]udicial intervention . . . is essential to the
principle of the rule of law," and that "fundamental human rights
require prompt review of detention by a judicial authority
independent of the executive. "94 The court acknowledged that
"[i]ntemational law does not specify the number of days during which
a detainee may be held without judicial intervention," but concluded
that the applicable principle is clear enough: "delays must not exceed
a few days"; even "an 'unlawful combatant' . . . is to be brought
promptly before a judge."95
The court accepted practical constraints - up to a point. It
acknowledged that " '[r]egular' police detention is not the same as
detention carried out 'during warfare in the area,' " and that it should
not be "demanded that a judge accompany the fighting forces."96 It
agreed that in battlefield seizures, judicial intervention must be
postponed, but only "until after detainees are taken out of the
battlefield to a place where the initial investigation and judicial
intervention can be carried out properly."97 Once the detainee is
moved from the zone of combat, a process that can be completed
within forty-eight hours even "during warfare," battlefield realities are
no longer relevant, and a judicial hearing must occur promptly.98
The court similarly rejected the military claim that the exigencies
of warfare required an eight-day delay in initiating the investigation of
92. Id. paras. 31-32.
93. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
94. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349.
95. Id. paras. 26, 27.
96. Id. para. 30.
97. Id.
98. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 46.
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detainees. Again, the court accepted several key practical points that "investigations should not be performed during warfare or during
military operations"; that "investigation can only begin when the
detainee . . . is brought to a detention facility"; and that "at a location
which holds large number of detainees, some time may pass before it
is possible to organize for initial investigations." Nonetheless, the
court held that the military must "begin the investigation rapidly at
this initial stage."99 The court therefore struck down the eight-day
(later four-day) grace period conferred by Order 1500 and its progeny,
ruling in effect that the investigation must begin more or less
immediately.100
One facet of the military-necessity argument is worth particular
attention. The IDF insisted that the scale of its operations and the
number of detainees made it impossible to process them in the usual
time periods. The court was not persuaded:
Security needs, on the one hand, and the liberty of the individual on the
other, all lead to the need to increase the number of investigators . . . .
[A]nd even more so when it was expected that the number of detainees
would rise due to Operation Defensive Wall . . . .
"A society is measured, among other things, by the relative weight it
attributes to personal liberty. This weight must express itself not only in
pleasant remarks and legal literature, but also in the budget . . . . Society
must be ready to pay a price to protect human rights."101

Similarly, the court said, difficulty in arranging for more judges cannot
justify delaying judicial review:
The current emergency conditions undoubtedly demanded large-scale
deployment of forces . . . . However, by the same standards, effort and
resources must be invested into the protection of the detainees'
rights . . . . Such is the case . . . with regard to prosecutors as well.102

The court declined to set a specific deadline for the judicial
hearing; instead it suspended the effect of its ruling for six months to
give the military an opportunity to implement a more expeditious
system.103 In subsequent regulations, the IDF provided for a judicial
99. Id. para. 48.
100. Id. paras. 48-49. In its effort to defend the delays in initiating an investigation and
holding the judicial hearing, the IDF sought to present classified information, but the court
ruled that it was "neither appropriate nor desirable" for it to consider such information. Id.
paras. 36, 49.
101. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 48 (quoting H.C. 6055/95, Tzemach v. Minister of
Defense, 53(5) P.D. 241, 281 (Zamir, J.)).
102. Id. para. 35 (quoting H.C. 253/88, Sajadia v. Minister of Defense, 42(3) P.D. 801,
819-20 (Shamgar, P.)).
103. Id. paras. 35-36.
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hearing within eight days, in effect the same period applicable under
normal Order 378 procedures. There has been no effort to overturn
the court's decision in the Knesset, and apparently the eight-day time
limit is now being respected in practice. 104
With respect to access to counsel, the court allowed more leeway.
It found that the right to counsel is not absolute, and that "significant
security considerations" can justify delay, as when "the lives of the
combat forces will be endangered due to opportunities to pass
messages out of the facility." But, said the court, "advancing the
investigation [i.e. facilitating interrogation] is not a sufficient reason to
prevent the meeting . . . . [T]here must be an element of necessity." It
allowed the army to deny contact with counsel for up to 34 days, four
days longer than the maximum permitted under ordinary occupation
regulations.105
Under the resulting system for the occupied territory, denial of
access to counsel is automatic only for the first two or four days;
thereafter access can be denied for two fifteen-day periods, but only
after a case-by-case determination of necessity. When necessity is
found, however, the detainee will be forced to face his judicial hearing
(after the eighth day) without the assistance of counsel. And in such a
case, the same security concerns would probably prompt the court to
refuse the detainee access to the evidence against him. In effect, the
judicial decision on detention would occur entirely ex parte, hardly an
ideal arrangement from a civil-liberties perspective. Even so, the
regime provides some check on military judgments and some
accountability. And the need to dispense with the stronger safeguard
of adversary challenge is itself determined by the court, not by the
officials whose own actions would be under scrutiny.106

104. E-mail from Lila Margalit, counsel to petitioners in Marab, 57(2) P.D. 349, to Eyal
Benvenisti, Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University (Nov. 5, 2003) (on file with author).
105. Marab, 57 (2) P.D. 349 para. 37, 45 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
106. The resulting regime of judicial review is, of course, rather weak in such
exceptional cases - i.e., in eighth-day detention hearings for alleged enemy combatants
seized in occupied territory and denied immediate access to counsel. Yet we should note that
in the United States, at a roughly comparable stage of the ordinary criminal process - the
forty-eight hour hearing to establish the legality of arrest - proceedings are also ex parte,
continued detention requires only the minimal evidence necessary to establish probable
cause, and as a result American judicial review is similarly weak even in routine, non
terrorism cases. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Significantly, however, the eighth
day hearing in Israel can result in detention for three months (renewable at that point, but
only at a hearing at which the detainee would by then have access to counsel). In contrast, in
the United States the ex parte probable-cause hearing can result in detention only until the
accused can make bail.
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Conclusion

Regardless of what one might think of Israeli policies vis-a-vis the
Palestinians, there is no doubt that from the perspective of the Israelis
themselves, the country faces a grave security situation, with ever
present danger to its military forces and civilian population centers, a
potentially never-ending threat that challenges its capacity to survive
as an independent nation. Nevertheless, Israeli courts have put in
place a strong, increasingly robust system of judicial checks.
Accountability in national security cases extends not only to law
enforcement actions within Israel proper but also to detentions that
result from military operations targeting "unlawful combatants" in
territories not j uridically part of Israel itself. Military and executive
officials seem to accept the court decisions imposing these safeguards.
And through more than twenty years of experience, during which the
terrorist threat and the judicial checking power have both intensified,
there has been no major effort to flout these safeguards openly or to
overturn them by legislation.
B.

Great Britain and Northern Ireland

After the shock of September 1 1 , 2001, it is easy to forget the fear
and loss of life occasioned by the intractable troubles in Northern
Ireland. It is important to recall the proportions of the crisis.
1.

The Context107

Britain granted independence to the Irish Free State (now the
Republic of Ireland) in 1922, but partitioned the island and retained
sovereignty over the six northeastern counties (Ulster) where
Protestant "Loyalists," roughly two-thirds of the population, preferred
to retain ties to the Crown. Britain also granted Northern Ireland a
large degree of home rule under a local Parliament in which
Protestants held unshakeable control, reinforced by gerrymandering
and other electoral maneuvers.108 In the 1960s a nonviolent civil rights
movement began growing in the north, with the aim of combating
housing, employment, and electoral discrimination against Catholics.
Tensions escalated as militants associated with the Irish Republican
Army ("IRA") gained influence within the civil rights movement and
107. For more detailed accounts, from which the discussion in text is drawn, see MARIE
THERESE FAY ET AL., NORTHERN IRELAND'S TROUBLES: THE HUMAN COSTS (1999);
CLIVE WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW (2d ed. 1992);
DERMOT P.J. WALSH, BLOODY SUNDAY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND
(2000).
108. WALSH, supra note 107, at 18-22.
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as Protestant Loyalists formed their own militant organizations and
"declar[ed] war" on the IRA in 1966.109 By 1969, civil rights
demonstrations had turned into violent confrontations between
Catholic protesters on one side and local police (the Royal Ulster
Constabulary, or "RUC"), joined by angry Protestants, on the other.
Protestants who opposed concessions to the Catholic civil rights
movement forced the resignation of the reformist Northern Ireland
prime minister and sponsored increasingly confrontational
demonstrations of their own.11°
The conflict soon outstripped the RUC's ability to maintain order,
and in August 1969 the British Army was called in to restore peace.
Nonetheless, the violence grew, and Protestant terror groups launched
their own campaign, bombing and burning Catholic-owned property.
In 1970 the violence on both sides escalated dramatically. By 1971 the
situation had degenerated into a public-order crisis. In the first seven
months of 1971 there were 304 bomb explosions; sixteen civilians and
fifteen Army and RUC personnel were killed.111 A major riot followed
on August 5, 1971.
Two days later, the Northern Ireland government assumed
emergency powers, and at dawn on August 9 it launched "Operation
Demetrius," an effort to round up suspected IRA terrorists. Security
forces arrested 354 on the first day. Of those, 104 were released within
forty-eight hours, and fourteen prime suspects were taken to secret
interrogation centers, where questioning continued for days, aided by
methods involving severe psychological and physical stress {the so
called "five techniques" - hooding, sleep deprivation, continuous
loud noise, deprivation of food and water, and forcing detainees to
remain standing in awkward positions). Meanwhile, on August 13, the
IRA called a press conference in Belfast to mock the operation and
announce that only thirty IRA militants had been caught in the sweep.
Violence continued, as did repressive actions in response. In
December 1971, Loyalists bombed a Belfast bar, killing fifteen
Catholics. In January 1972, British soldiers assigned to maintain order
shot and killed thirteen Catholic demonstrators in Londonderry. IRA
reprisals and other attacks, as many as five to ten each day, took a
huge toll. In the seven months following Operation Demetrius, there
were 1 130 explosions, 2000 shootings, and a total of 233 fatalities, 158
of them civilian. At that point, in March 1972, the United Kingdom

109. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310171, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 33 (1978)
(Court judgment).
1 10. Id. at 34-35.
111. Id. at 34-36.
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Parliament displaced the local Northern Ireland government and
assumed direct rule.112
The violence did not abate. On "Bloody Friday" in July 1972, the
IRA detonated twenty bombs in the center of B elfast, killing eleven
and seriously wounding 100 others. Terrorism by IRA and Loyalist
factions occurred regularly throughout the 1970s. The IRA attacked in
Britain as well. An October 1974 bombing in Guildford, England,
killed five and injured 54.113 A month later, the IRA bombed two pubs
in Birmingham, claiming twenty-one lives and injuring 184 in an attack
that The Times of London described as an act of war.114 During the
1970s, several prominent British politicians were assassinated, and in
March 1979 a member of the House of Commons was killed by a car
bomb on the grounds of Parliament. In 1982 an IRA attack against an
army unit on parade in London killed eleven and injured thirty. On
Christmas 1983 a car bomb exploded at Harrod's in London, killing six
and injuring 93. 115
For the twenty-year period from the start of the troubles through
1990, the casualty figures for Northern Ireland alone total more than
2750 killed (2000 of them civilians) and more than 31,900 seriously
injured, all in a territory with a population of only 1.5 million.116 For a
city the size of New York, such figures would represent the equivalent
of 1 1,000 civilian fatalities, the killing of 4300 law enforcement
officers, and over 170,000 serious injuries attributable to terrorism.
The public demand for firm counter-measures is easy to imagine.
2.

The UK Legal Framework

The law governing arrest and detention in Northern Ireland is
multi-layered and has been in constant flux. In addition to the
ordinary rules of criminal procedure, a regime of emergency powers
enacted in 1922 was still in place when the troubles began. That
regime was replaced by new emergency legislation for Northern
1 12. Id. at 38-41; FAY , supra note 107, at 27-28.
1 13. FAY, supra note 107, at 30.
1 14. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'lI 22.
1 15. WALKER, supra note 107, at 245.
116. See Fox, Campbell & Hartley v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 157, 'l[ 1 5
(1991). During the mid-1980s, a series o f temporary truces had reduced the fatality rate, but
terrorism persisted on a wide scale until the early 1990s. In the context of peace negotiations,
the IRA announced an end to its military operations in August 1994, British army patrols
were reduced or suspended, and in April 1998 the Good Friday Accords began an era of
relative peace. Even then, terrorist actions by splinter groups continued. In July 1998, a
Loyalist bomb killed three children in their home, and a month later, a dissident faction of
the IRA detonated a car bomb in a small market town, killing 29 and injuring over 200. FAY ,
supra note 107, at 43-49.
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Ireland enacted on a "temporary" basis in 1972 and renewed at
frequent intervals thereafter. Additional emergency powers were
available in legislation applicable throughout the UK. Courts
interpreted these enactments against the background of common law
principles, World War II precedents and, most recently, the European
Convention on Human Rights. From a beginning marked by virtually
unrestricted military/executive powers, brutally implemented, the
legislation and practice evolved to reflect a growing view that such
harsh measures were unjust and counterproductive.
a. Ordinary criminal investigation. The scope of executive power to
detain, a sore point in British history for centuries, gave us Magna
Carta's most famous passage: "No Freeman shall be taken or
imprisoned . . . but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of
the land."117 And continued struggle over royal efforts to evade this
restriction fueled development of the writ of habeas corpus, to .
guarantee availability of a judicial check upon all forms of executive
detention.1 18
By the late twentieth century, these principles had evolved into
rules governing arrest now codified in the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984 ("PACE"). PACE requires "reasonable grounds
for suspecting" to support an arrest119 and tightly regulates detention
prior to lodging a formal charge. Normally, arrestees must be released
or charged within twenty-four hours.120 A supervising police officer
can extend the period of initial detention, but only for an additional
twelve hours. Further detention without charge must be authorized by
a judge and cannot exceed a total of ninety-six hours from the initial
moment of arrest.121 Once a formal charge is lodged (no later than
ninety-six hours after arrest), the accused has a right to bail (subject to

117. Magna Carta, 1215, 9 Hen. 3, c. 29 (Eng.).
118. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
119. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 § 25(1) (Eng.) [hereinafter PACE]; see
David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY
91, 95-98 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999).
120. The twenty-fo ur-hour period begins to run from the moment of arrest or the
moment when the individual arrived at the police station, whichever occurred first. PACE,
supra note 1 19, § 41; Feldman, supra note 1 19, at 100.
121. PACE, supra note 1 1 9, §§ 43, 44; Feldman, supra note 1 19, at 100-01; see ANTONIO
VERCHER, TERRORISM IN EUROPE: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS
30 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992). The standard for extended detention is a showing that
continued detention is "necessary to enable evidence of a 'serious arrestable offence' to be
secured (usually by questioning) or preserved, and that the investigation is being conducted
'diligently and expeditiously.' " Feldman, supra note 1 1 9, at 100 (quoting PACE, supra note
119, § 42). By comparison, a suspect arrested without a warrant in the United States cannot
be held for more than forty-eight hours prior to a judicial determination of probable cause.
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
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exceptions), and the case must be brought to trial expeditiously,
though specific time limits are not fixed by law.122
b. Emergency powers: the World Wars. During both world wars,
despite the almost religious prestige of habeas corpus, the government
assumed detention powers that were essentially unchecked.
Regulation 14B, promulgated in 1915, allowed the Home Secretary to
order the internment of any person, if it appeared to him "that for
securing the public safety or the defence of the realm [detention] is
expedient in view of the (person's] hostile origin or association."123
The only remedy available to an internee was to petition a
government committee which could only recommend, not order his
release. Internees failed in their attempt to use habeas corpus as a
check on this scheme. The House of Lords said it was "necessary in a
time of great public danger to entrust great powers to [the executive]"
and accepted on faith that "such powers will be reasonably
exercised. "124
The World War II powers were similar. Regulation 18B,
promulgated on the first day of the war, gave the Home Secretary
power to detain any person if satisfied that detention was necessary to
prevent actions "prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the
realm."125 Shortly thereafter, when members of Parliament expressed
concern that the broadly worded Regulation could permit abuse, it
was amended to require that the Home Secretary have "reasonable
cause to believe."126 As before, detainees were allowed to appeal to a
committee which could only recommend release.
During the war, almost 2000 individuals were detained without
trial under Regulation 18B. Many were British citizens, including
prominent leaders of right-wing, fascist organizations and even a
sitting member of Parliament.127 Far from scrutinizing these cases, the
courts held that "reasonable cause" set an entirely subjective standard
and that a detention order could be challenged only by establishing
bad faith or mistaken identity,128 a showing that was virtually
impossible to make.129
122. See Feldman, supra note 1 19, at 116-17.
123. VERCHER, supra note 121, at 10.
124. Rex v. Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260, 268-69.
125. See A.W . BRIAN SIMPSON, IN THE H IGHEST DEGREE ODIOUS 65 (1992).
126. Id. (quoting Emergency Powers (Defence) General Regulations, 1939, Stat. R. &
0., No. 1681, 18B (Detention Orders)).
127. DONALD W . JACKSON, THE UNITED KINGDOM CONFRONTS T HE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 45 (1997); SIMPSON, supra note 125, at 133-14, 174-79,
222.
128. E.g., Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206, 206.
129. SIMPSON, supra note 125, at 362; see JACKSON, supra note 127, at 46-47.
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Regulation 18B left a mixed legacy. As a signal of the
government's determination to fight on at all cost in the dark days of
June 1940, it probably helped build morale (though other means might
have served as well), and it may have prevented a few pro-German
sympathizers from acts of sabotage or espionage. Yet even during the
war, it became clear that the great majority of 18B detainees were
harmless, that genuine spies were captured by other means, and that
more limited methods almost certainly would have sufficed to address
whatever danger the 18B detainees posed.13° Churchill supported 18B
during the crisis of 1940 but later came to consider it abhorrent.
Though his Cabinet did not revoke it until the European fighting
ended, Churchill's assessment in 1943 was not equivocal: "The power
of the Executive to cast a man into prison without formulating any
charge known to the law, and particularly to deny him the judgement
of his peers, is in the highest degree odious and is the foundation of all
totalitarian government whether Nazi or Communist."131
c. Emergency powers in Northern Ireland. A regime granting
similar emergency authority {the Special Powers Act, 1922) was on the
books from the moment of the Irish partition. Regulations
promulgated under the Act recognized four forms of extrajudicial
detention: (1) warrantless arrest for interrogation, allowed for forty
eight hours with no need for any suspicion at all;132 (2) arrest for
seventy-two hours on suspicion that the arrestee had committed or
was about to commit an offense; (3) detention for up to twenty-eight
days to enable police to complete an investigation; and (4)
"internment" for an indefinite period on an executive determination
that "internment was expedient in the interests of the preservation of
peace."133 Internees were afforded only a narrow avenue· of redress, an
appeal to an administrative committee with power to recommend (but
not order) release. The internee had no right to appear before the
committee, no right to be represented by counsel, and no right to call,
confront or cross-examine witnesses.
These were the powers that came into force when the home-rule
government declared a state of emergency and launched Operation
Demetrius on August 9, 1971. Eight months later, as soon as home
rule was suspended, the U.K. government began releasing prisoners
and announced its intention to phase out executive detention and
130. For detailed and more nuanced elaboration of these points, see SIMPSON, supra
note 125, at 409-13.
131. Id. at frontispiece; see also id. at vii, 408.
132. It was RUC practice to use this provision to arrest eyewitnesses and others not
suspected of wrongdoing, who, they believed, could not or would not speak freely unless
questioned in private.
133. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep 25, 'll'lI 81-84; JACKSON, supra note 127, at 35; VERCHER,
supra note 121, at 19.
.
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internment, not because violence was declining (the opposite had
occurred) but as a means to ease tension and pave the way for a
negotiated peace.134
In November 1972 the U.K. government rescinded the detention
and internment regulations but replaced them with a new regime for
Northern Ireland that was only mildly more protective of the suspect.
It preserved the forty-eight-hour and seventy-two-hour arrest
provisions, and it preserved the essence of the detention and
internment powers, adding only a largely symbolic new safeguard the right, in the existing administrative appeal against internment, to a
limited adversary hearing before a quasi-independent commissioner.135
From 1972 through the 1990s the U.K. Parliament renewed the
Northern Ireland emergency legislation annually. But in response to a
series of independent assessments of the legislation and its practice,
Parliament gradually introduced significant restrictions. It allowed the
internment power to lapse in 1980. In 1984, an independent judicial
inquiry questioned the fairness and need for arrest powers that
required no more than subjective suspicion; in response, the special
arrest powers for Northern Ireland were eliminated in 1987,136 leaving
available only the emergency powers applicable throughout the U.K.
(discussed below), which required reasonable suspicion testable in
court.
d. Emergency powers in Britain. The Guilford and Birmingham
bombings of October-November 1974 triggered irresistible demand
for deploying emergency powers within Britain itself. One member of
Parliament described the situation as "the greatest threat since the end
of the Second World War."137 The Home Secretary introduced a bill
that he characterized as "Draconian" but "fully justified to meet the
clear and present danger."138 A mere eight days after the Birmingham
attacks, Parliament had enacted the Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Act of 1974 ("PTA"). The "temporary" part
of the title proved to be a mirage; the Act was renewed at six-month
and one-year intervals, with little substantive change, for decades.

134. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'II 50; VERCHER, supra note 121, at 17. By November
1972 there had been no new detentions or internments and the majority of the existing
prisoners had been released. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'II 64.
135. See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'II 'II 86, 87. Detainees and their counsel were
granted a limited right to attend the hearing but no right to call or cross-examine witnesses.
VERCHER, supra note 121, at 20-21 , concludes that the attempt to judicialize the procedure
broke down because of reliance on hearsay evidence and because the power of the Secretary
of State to intervene made the proceeding "essentially executive (in] character."
136. See Fox, Campbell & Hartley, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 157, 'II 19.
137. WALKER, supra note107, at 22.
138. Id. at 22.
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In addition to its provisions relating to detention, the PTA
prohibited support for proscribed organizations "concerned in
terrorism," modestly relaxed the rules governing searches, and
authorized the exclusion from Britain of U.K. citizens ordinarily
resident in Northern Ireland (and vice versa) when the person appears
to be a person "concerned in the commission, preparation or
instigation of acts of terrorism."139
The PTA granted new powers of arrest and detention but retained
many safeguards that had become standard in British law
enforcement. Unlike the emergency regulations for Northern Ireland,
it required an arresting officer to have "reasonable grounds." The
most important departure from ordinary safeguards was the provision
extending the period of detention without judicial control. In contrast
to the British benchmark for ordinary cases (twenty-four or at most
thirty-six hours from arrest to first judicial appearance), the Act gave
forty-eight hours and allowed a cabinet-rank official to prolong that
period for five more days, for a total of up to seven days' detention
prior to judicial review.140
The principal goal of the new detention power was to afford more
time for interrogation without outside interference:
[M]any of those . . . detain[ed] under the Act adopt an attitude during
interview which is quite different from that of most other suspected
criminals; some of them, for example, show an indifference to their own
personal future and a refusal to co-operate in any way. This . . . makes
the task of the police in interviewing [the suspect] more difficult.141

The maximum period of pre-charge detention (seven days) was only
three days longer than the ninety-six-hour maximum permitted under
PACE.142 Nonetheless, the system drew criticism because no criteria
were specified for the decision to extend detention and no judge
participated in approving it.143
At the outset there were few safeguards to guarantee proper
treatment of detainees. But abuses brought to light by periodic
139. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, §§ 1(1), 4(1), 5(1)
(Eng.) (hereinafter PTA); WALKER, supra note 107, at 139-42. Exclusion orders were
described as "largely preventative in conception, but punitive in execution." W. L. Twining,
Emergency Powers and Criminal Process: The Diplock Report, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 406, 415.
140. Additional emergency legislation applicable only in Northern Ireland partially
overlaps with the PTA, but generally grants fewer special powers than the PTA. WALKER,
supra note 107, at 1 29-31.
141. WALKER, supra note 107, at 126 (quoting LORD SHACKLETON, REVIEW OF THE
OPERATION OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS ) ACTS 1974
AND 1976, Cmnd. 7324, para. 72 (1978)).
142. Under PACE, an arrestee can be detained a maximum of thirty-six hours prior to
his first judicial appearance, and the court can approve detention for an additional sixty
hours, prior to charge. See supra text accompanying notes 120-121.
143. WALKER, supra note 107, at 125-26.
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independent reviews144 prompted the adoption of administrative
safeguards applicable only to terrorism suspects (greater supervision
by senior officers, "meticulous documentation," greater medical
supervision, and a code of conduct for interrogators).145 In certain
respects, however, terrorism suspects were accorded fewer rights than
other detainees. Interrogations were not routinely recorded, as they
are in the case of other suspects, and access to outside assistance was
restricted. Under PACE an arrestee must be permitted access to a
solicitor within thirty-six hours. But for terrorism suspects, the PTA
allowed an additional twelve hours' delay and authorized police to
monitor meetings between the detainee and his lawyer. Although the
power to monitor consultations was not widely used, police routinely
chose to isolate terrorism suspects from counsel for the maximum
forty-eight-hour period.146
The added power to detain suspects incommunicado might seem
trivial compared to that now claimed in the U.S. (twelve additional
hours in Britain - for a total of forty-eight hours - versus two years
or longer in the United States). Nonetheless, the British measures
were controversial. Many argued that the forty-eight-hour delay was
excessive, even in the context of the acute terrorist threat, and that the
power to overhear lawyer-client conversations, though available only
to a police inspector not connected to the investigation, transformed
access to counsel "into either a trap or a hollow ritual."147
The special powers were extensively used. For the decade 1 974-84,
the PTA was invoked to support nearly 6000 detentions in Britain,
with half of them concentrated in the years 1975-77. Yet less than ten
percent of the detentions in Britain extended beyond the initial forty
eight-hour period. In two of the busiest years, 1976-77, there were
more than 1900 detentions, but only eighty-eight exceeded forty-eight
hours.148 The pattern in Northern Ireland was different. For the same
decade, there were 4360 PTA detentions, a number vastly larger
(relative to population) than the detention figure for Britain. RUC use
of PTA detentions powers became especially common in the early
1980s, with nearly 1000 detentions in each of the years 1982-84. And
unlike the pattern for detentions in Britain, nearly three-quarters of
the detentions in Northern Ireland exceeded forty-eight hours.149
144. Semi-independent government reports on the implementation of the emergency
legislation were produced, inter alia, in 1978 (the Shackleton Report), 1979 (the Bennett
Report), and 1982 (the Jellicoe Report). WALKER, supra note 107, at 24-27, 126-27.
145. Id. at 127.
146. Id. at 129.
147. Id.
148. WALKER, supra note 107, at 133.
149. Id. at 135.
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The U.K. Courts

Judges sitting in Northern Ireland initially showed little inclination
to restrict the detention effort. Prisoners had an unquestioned right to
file habeas petitions and get hearings. Only on rare occasions did they
succeed in winning release.
As a practical matter, it was difficult to get a case heard before the
three-day or seven-day limits at which the police had to charge or
release the arrestee in any event.1so To that extent, habeas corpus was
often, in practice, a meaningless remedy.1s1 Nonetheless, some
detainees succeeded in getting habeas petitions heard almost
immediately;1s2 others sought to vindicate their rights by suits for false
imprisonment.
Judicial remedies, though far from perfect, were increasingly
effective in setting standards that executive authorities felt compelled
to respect. The judges had insisted from the beginning that some
access to courts must remain a reality.1s3 And over time, with varying
degrees of legislative support or acquiescence, the courts played a key
role in compelling respect for three substantive rights - notification
of the grounds for arrest; prompt access to counsel; and judicial review
of the reasonableness of the arresting officer's suspicions.
a. Notification. From the earliest cases growing out of Operation
Demetrius, courts made clear that although the emergency regulations
left judges no room to consider reasonableness,1s4 they would intervene
in cases of proven bad faith or failure to follow formal requirements.1ss
And they read into the regulations a requirement, drawn from the
common-law notification rule,1s6 that an arrestee be informed "in
unambiguous terms" of the reasons for his arrest. Thus, if the arresting
officer could not remember what he had said at the time of arrest, the
arrest was invalid, and the affected detainee was granted an order to
"be discharged forthwith."1s7
The government challenged the notification rule head-on, arguing
that it "ought not to be applied to an arrest under the Special Powers
Act [in a] national emergency when the overriding considerations
ought to be the safety of the State and the speed and efficiency of the
150. See id. at 123.
151. See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, '!I'll 82-84.
152. E.g., Ex parte Lynch, N. Ir. L.R. 126 (Q.B. 1 980}.
153. See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'II'II 219-220 (noting in 1978 the availability of
"valuable, if limited, review effected by the courts").
154. McKee v. Chief Constable, 1 W.L.R. 1358 (H.L. 1984).
155. See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, '!I'll 82-84.
156. Christie v. Leachinsky, A.C. 573 (H.L. 1947).
157. E.g., In re McElduff, N. Ir. L.R. 1 , 26 (Q.B. 1972).
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arrest." The courts were unpersuaded: "No such exigency has been
proved as would involve the abandonment of [this] elementary
requirement of the common law . . . . " 158
b. Reasonableness. During the years 1971-87, terrorism suspects
arrested in Northern Ireland could be held for seventy-two hours on
the basis of entirely subjective suspicion. During those years,
therefore, courts had no occasion to review the substantive basis for
arrest, at least during the initial seventy-two-hour period. Nonetheless,
judicial review of reasonableness remained available for all arrests in
Britain and for arrests in Northern Ireland that law enforcement
officers chose to effect under the PTA, which was applicable
throughout the UK. And despite the PTA's reasonableness
requirement, the RUC frequently relied upon it, rather than the
legislation limited to Northern Ireland, because it permitted four days'
additional detention (seven rather than three) and because RUC
officers reportedly felt confident that courts would consider their
honestly held suspicions to be reasonable.159
Beginning in 1987, as a result of legislation, all arrests (including
those in Northern Ireland) had to be founded on reasonable grounds
subject to scrutiny in court. 1 60 No doubt judicial review was typically
deferential, and it was hampered in any event by the police privilege
to protect confidential sources. 1 61 Nonetheless courts sometimes did
hold arrests void on the ground that the underlying suspicions were
unreasonable, and significant damages were awarded for false
imprisonment. 1 62
c. Access to counsel and others. Under PACE suspects in ordinary
criminal investigations normally have access to counsel from the
moment of arrest, a right to have a relative or friend notified
immediately, and the right to have counsel present during
interrogation. 1 63 The emergency provisions modified these rights in
four significant respects. They permitted police to deny terrorism
suspects access to counsel for forty-eight hours after arrest; they
permitted a forty-eight-hour delay in notifying the suspect's relatives;
after an initial consultation with counsel, they guaranteed a right to
158. Kelly v. Faulkner, N. Ir. L.R. 31, 36 (Q.B. 1973); see also VERCHER, supra note 121,
at 57-59.
159. See Fox, Campbell & Hartley, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 157, 'lI 19.
160. See text accompanying note 136, supra.
161. As a result of the privilege of confidentiality, Vercher concluded in 1992 that
"arrests are de facto unchallengeable in court." VERCHER, supra note 121, at 60-61.
162. E.g., Van Hout v. Chief Constable, N. Ir. (1984 Q.B.) (awarding £ 2500 for 1 2 days
of detention).
163. PACE, supra note 1 19, § 65; Averill v. United Kingdom, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36, 'lI 36
(2000).
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further consultation only at forty-eight-hour intervals; and they denied
the right to have counsel present at the police interview itself.164
Detainees nonetheless retained "an absolute and legally enforceable
right to consult a solicitor after 48 hours from the time of arrest."165
Though delayed access to counsel became commonplace,
significant checks on arbitrary police action remained. Counter
terrorism investigators kept precise time sheets, and in the reported
cases, suspects typically did gain access to counsel at the forty-eight
hour point - or at most a few hours later - even when they were still
successfully resisting interrogation.166 Many suspects were allowed
access to their solicitors sooner, even in important cases.167 Access to a
doctor of the detainee's choice and the right to inform a relative or
friend about the arrest were preserved on a similar basis.168
A judicial check was also operative - even during the first forty
eight hours. Because access to counsel could be denied only on
"reasonable grounds" to believe counsel would impede the
investigation, delay could be challenged in court and was, at least in
theory, subject to j udicial scrutiny.169 The burden to establish
"reasonable grounds" was (in theory) on the prosecutionY0 At least
one independent assessment concluded that these checks were not
purely theoretical: " [J]udicial review has been shown to be a speedy
and effective manner of ensuring that access to a solicitor is not
arbitrarily withheld."171 In many cases, British courts found delayed
access to counsel unreasonable, even within the initial forty-eight-hour
period, and granted immediate access to a solicitor.172
164. See A verill, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36, 'lI 35.
165. Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 'lI 64 (1994); see
also WALKER, supra note 107, at 127 (finding an "unconditional right of access to a lawyer
after each forty-eight hours of detention").
166. Suspect Brannigan was granted access to his solicitor at the forty-eight hour point,
though his interrogation had not borne fruit. Brannigan, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 'lI 10. John
Murray, who also refused to speak, was allowed access to his solicitor after 49 hours. Murray
v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, 'lI 11 (1996). Gerard Magee confessed after about
thirty-six hours in custody, but was not allowed to meet his solicitor until fifty-five hours
after arrest. Magee v. United Kingdom, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 822, 'lI'lI 8, 12 (2000).
167. Liam Averill, suspected (and ultimately convicted) in a multiple assassination, was
allowed access to his solicitor after an unfruitful interrogation and a total of twenty-four
hours in custody. A verill, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36, 'lI 1 1 . Patrick McBride, an uncooperative
suspect, was allowed to see his solicitor on the day of his arrest and again forty-eight hours
later. Brannigan, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 'lI 1 1 .
168. Brannigan, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 'lI 24. In addition, i t was standard practice, at
least after 1979, to conduct a medical examination before interviewing a suspect and at
frequent intervals thereafter. Id.
169. Id. 'lI 24.
170. Id. 'lI 64.
171. Id. 'lI 64.
172. Id. 'lI 24.
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Overall, on matters of national security the U.K. courts made only
modest efforts to control executive action. But the scope of judicial
review gradually expanded over time, and the mere possibility of
judicial intervention did restrain to some degree the rather wide
discretion that executive authorities enjoyed in practice.173 Judicial
remedies in the U.K. courts were soon reinforced, moreover, by the
oversight functions.of the European Court of Human Rights.
4.

International Constraints: The European Convention on Human
Rights

Britain's obligations as a signatory of the European Convention on
Human Rights are not j ust theoretical. Unlike many international
human-rights documents, the European Convention not only defines
basic rights but provides institutions to enforce them. The European
Convention created an international court with jurisdiction to hear
citizens' complaints against their own governments and to order states
to provide remedies to injured individuals. The European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) cannot reverse the judgment of a national
court, but it can grant money damages to injured parties, and after its
decisions are rendered, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe is charged with verifying that offending laws and practices of
member nations are corrected.174 For readers unfamiliar with the
context in which U.K. actions came under scrutiny at the European
level, the Appendix to this Article describes the structure of the
European Convention, its overall system of criminal procedure
guarantees, and the ECHR's role in enforcing them.
The ECHR has played an increasingly active role in enforcing
Convention requirements not only in the U.K. but in other European
nations, including Germany and Turkey, where persistent terrorism
has put human-rights norms under pressure. In connection with U.K.
counter-terrorism efforts, the European Court has been especially
active in helping guarantee respect for three components of due
process, the requirements that detainees be brought to court promptly;
that detentions be supported by reasonable suspicion; and that the
"courts" entrusted with implementing these checks be independent
bodies of a judicial character.
a. Independence and judicial character. Throughout the European
Convention are rules requiring action or approval by "a court," "a
judge," or an official entrusted with "judicial power." The ECHR case
173. See generally Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'II 220; VERCHER, supra note 121, at 6573, 85.
174. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, art. 46, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 246 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
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law has drawn from these terms a series of demanding requirements.
For a tribunal to qualify as a court, it must be "independen[t] of the
executive" and must afford "the guarantees of j udicial procedure."175
The court has applied the requirement of independence not only to
civil and criminal courts but also to military tribunals, a focal point of
current controversies in the United States. The ECHR ruled that
courts-martial, as traditionally structured in European armies, were
unacceptable because they permitted trial of soldiers by j udges serving
within the military chain of command.176 In British army procedure
(similar to our own) court-martial judges were "subordinate in rank"
to the convening officer and were "directly or ultimately under his
command."177 Moreover, a court-martial ruling "was not effective until
ratified by [the convening officer], and he had the power to vary the
sentence imposed."178 Such a body could not be a "court" within the
meaning of the Convention: The subordinate status of court-martial
members created "doubts about the tribunal's independence and
impartiality"; moreover, "the power to give a binding decision which
may not be altered by a non-judicial authority is inherent in the very
notion of 'tribunal' . . . . "179 As required by these rulings, court-martial
procedure was extensively revised in British and other European
armies.180 And the safeguards available to active-duty soldiers carried
over to issues affecting suspected IRA or civilian terrorists.
To qualify as a "court," a tribunal also must afford "the guarantees
of j udicial procedure," which means "guarantees appropriate to the
kind of deprivation of liberty in question. "181 In civil commitment, for
example, the stakes are analogous to criminal punishment, and
therefore, the ECHR reasoned, the procedures must be analogous to
those of a criminal trial. An adversarial hearing before an independent

175. De Wilde, Ooms & Versyp v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 373, 'l! 78 (1971).
176. De Jong, Baljet & van den Brink v. The Netherlands, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20, 'lI 47
(1984); Schiesser v. Switzerland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 414, 'II 31 (1979). In related rulings, the
Court held that a military judge could not satisfy Convention requirements if he could not
order release but only recommend it to higher military authority, De Jong, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep.
20, 'II 48; or if he could later become involved as a prosecuting officer, and thereby lose the
required "independen[ce) of the parties." Id. 'l! 49.
177. Findlay v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 221, 'l!'II 75-76 (1997). With respect
to courts-martial in the United States, 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1998), confers on the
convening officer the authority to select subordinate officers as courts-martial members.
178. Id. 'II 77.
179. Id. 'l!'l! 76-77.
180. For Britain, see Armed Forces Act, 1996, c. 16 (Eng.), discussed in Findlay, 24 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 221, 'l!'l! 52-57, 60, and in Cooper v. United Kingdom, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 171, 'l!'l!
105-134 (2003). For the Netherlands, see E-mail from the Nico Keijzer, retired Justice,
Netherlands Supreme Court, to the author (Aug. 24 & Aug. 25, 2003) (on file with author).
See generally EUROPEAN MILITARY LAW SYSTEMS (Georg Nolte ed., 2003).
181. De Wilde, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 373, 'II 76 (1971).
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magistrate did not qualify as "judicial," the court reasoned, because
the proceeding did not provide for the full panoply of criminal trial
safeguards.182 Though the ECHR has not yet had occasion to consider
a process for detaining an "enemy combatant," that situation would
seem to pose a similar problem of ostensibly non-punitive but
potentially lifetime confinement. In contrast to the apparent position
of the Hamdi plurality, 183 the European Court seems prepared to insist
that such a process afford safeguards fully comparable to those of the
criminal trial.
The requirements of independence and appropriate procedure
posed one of many Convention problems for the Northern Ireland
emergency laws. Under regulations in force from 1971-80, suspects
interned were granted an appeal to a review committee, but this body
was not independent of the executive branch, its decisions were
advisory only, and it denied many traditional procedural guarantees.184
On all three grounds, the ECHR held, the review committee could not
qualify as the "court" that the Convention required.185 The U.K.
government argued that the availability of habeas corpus offered an
answer to this problem. Habeas courts were "independent," followed
traditional judicial procedure, could order release, and actually had
ordered the release some detained terror suspects.186 But because the
emergency regime blocked habeas courts from granting bail or
determining whether the basis for detention was "reasonable," the
ECHR ruled that their powers were "not sufficiently wide in scope,
taking into account the purpose [of the judicial inquiry required by]
the Convention."187
b. Prompt access to courts: the initial approach. Less than four
months after the launching of Operation Demetrius, the Irish
Republic invoked the Convention to challenge the treatment of
suspected IRA detainees.188 After extensive factual investigation, the
182. Id. 'll 'll 79-80.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30. It should be noted, however, that the
Hamdi plurality's apparent approval of diluted safeguards was limited to the context of
battlefield seizures, a context that the ECHR (unlike the Israeli Supreme Court, see supra
Part Ill.A.6) has yet to consider. The Hamdi plurality expressed no view on the procedures
required for alleged "enemy combatants" seized outside a zone of active military operations.
See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
1 84. See supra text accompanying notes 133-135.
185. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'lI 200.
1 86. See, e.g. , In re McElduff, N. Ir. L.R. 1 (Q.B. 1972).
187. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'lI 200.
188. The complaint encompassed those arrested in the initial sweep and others detained
while the case remained under investigation: nearly 3000 individuals detained from August
1971 through March 1972, and over 200 individuals allegedly subjected to severe abuse while
in custody. Id. 'll 'll 81, 93.
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ECHR rendered its decision in December 1977. The "troubles" had by
no means receded. For Northern Ireland alone, the death toll then
stood at well over 1000.189 Lethal violence was still occurring daily.190
The Irish complaint focused on brutality in interrogations and on
the practice of extended detention without judicial review. The court's
decision in Ireland v. United Kingdom is widely known for its
unequivocal condemnation of the so-called "five techniques" of
stressful interrogation (hooding, sleep deprivation, continuous loud
noise, deprivation of food and water, and forcing detainees to remain
standing in awkward positions). These, the court ruled, constitute
inhuman and degrading treatment, in violation of Article 3 of the
Convention. They can never be permitted, even in the gravest
national-security emergency.191
With respect to extrajudicial detention, the court ruled that
practices in Northern Ireland violated numerous Convention
requirements. Mere witnesses and bystanders could be held for up to
forty-eight hours, solely for interrogation (an impermissible purpose);
suspected offenders were not brought to court "promptly" or at all;
they were not afforded the right to have "the lawfulness of [their]
detention . . . decided speedily by a court"; and the advisory
committee's review of internment "did not afford the fundamental
guarantees inherent in the notion of 'court. ' "192
But within days of launching Operation Demetrius, the U.K. had
filed a formal notice of derogation with respect to all these
Convention requirements.193 Under the European Convention system,
signatory states can suspend their obligation to comply with certain
(not all) of the Convention's requirements - but only when there is a
"public emergency threatening the life of the nation," and even then,
only "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation."194 Given the circumstances prevailing in Northern Ireland,
the existence of a "public emergency threatening the life of the
nation" - in particular, its territorial integrity - was beyond dispute.
189. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'JI 12.
190. The court noted, for example, that from January through June 1976, there had been
173 murders (virtually one every day) and 770 other persons had been injured in acts of
terrorism in Northern Ireland. Id. 'lI 76.
191. See Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'lI 96. Before the court, the British did not attempt
to defend the five techniques. Although a 1972 government commission had concluded that
with sufficient safeguards, the techniques need not be prohibited, the government accepted
the dissenting commissioner's view that the techniques were never morally justifiable, even
in emergency conditions. As a result, the government had renounced the use of the five
techniques and committed never to re-introduce them. See id. 'll 'll 100-02.
192. Id. 'JI 200 (citation omitted because of vagueness in the original source).
193. Id. 'JI 79.
194. European Convention on Human Rights art. 15(1), supra note 174, 213 U.N.T.S. at
232. For discussion of this power of "derogation," see the Appendix, infra.
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The Irish complaint centered on whether the means adopted were
"strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." The issue,
therefore, touched the central dilemma of checks and balances in a
national emergency: to what extent is it appropriate for courts to
"second guess" judgments of national security and military necessity
made by the executive at times of crisis.
The ECHR's answer was nuanced, but in this early confrontation
with executive emergency measures, its conclusions were ultimately
deferential. The court noted that national authorities were in a better
position to judge the circumstances; that they were accordingly
entitled to a wide berth; but that:
the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect. The Court,
[being] responsible for ensuring the observance of the States'
engagements . . . , is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone
beyond the 'extent strictly required . . . . ' The domestic margin of
appreciation [the State's claim to deference] is thus accompanied by a
European supervision.195

In the end the court accepted that all the detention measures were
strictly necessary. It stressed the extraordinary character of the
security situation, the strictly limited periods allowed for detention in
most circumstances, the "valuable, if limited, review effected by the
courts," and above all, that legislation and practice have:
evolved in the direction of increasing respect for individual liberty. . . .
When a State is struggling against a public emergency threatening the life
of the nation, it would be rendered defenceless if it were required to
accomplish everything at once . . . . The interpretation of [derogation
requirements] must leave a place for progressive adaptations.196

c. Prompt access to courts: the evolving standard. Over the next
twenty years the ECHR frequently revisited the requirement of
prompt judicial review, and it grew increasingly willing to question the
U.K. emergency detention practices. During the early 1980s, when a
series of temporary truces reduced the fatality rate to some degree,
the U.K. withdrew its derogation and announced that henceforth it
would fully respect Convention requirements.197 It was quickly
charged with non-compliance. Terence Brogan was arrested in
September 1984. The day after his arrest, authorities invoked the PTA
emergency power to extend detention for an additional five days.
Brogan remained silent throughout his interrogation and was allowed
to see his solicitor on the second and fourth days after arrest. He was
never taken to court and was released without charges after five and a
195. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 'll 207.
196. Id. 'll'll 219-220.
197. See Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117, 'l[ 48 (1988).
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half days of detention. Together with three others detained under
similar circumstances,198 Brogan brought suit in the European Court.
The issue again was whether U.K. practice met the requirement
that detainees "be brought promptly before a judge" in order to have
"the lawfulness of [their] detention . . . decided speedily by a court."199
None of the Brogan complainants had been brought to court at all;
they had been released first. If their release was "prompt," they would
have no cause to complain, but " [i]f the arrested person is not released
promptly, he is entitled to a prompt appearance before a judge . . . . "200
The question in Brogan therefore was whether release within four to
six days could be considered "prompt."
The court ruled that it could not - that even the shortest of the
four periods of detention (four days) was excessive. Its analysis,
dramatically at odds with the arguments for incommunicado detention
now pressed in the United States, is worth quoting at length:201
[Article 5] enshrines a fundamental human right, namely the protection
of the individual against arbitrary interferences by the State with his right
to liberty. Judicial control of interferences by the executive with the
individual's right to liberty is an essential feature of the guarantee
embodied in Article 5 . . . . Judicial control is implied by the rule of law,
"one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society" . . . .
[Special circumstances] can never be taken to the point of . . . effectively
negativing the State's obligation to ensure a prompt release or a prompt
appearance before a judicial authority . . . .
The investigation of terrorist offences undoubtedly presents the
authorities with special problems . . . . [T]he context of terrorism in
Northern Ireland has the effect of prolonging the period during which
the authorities may . . . keep a person suspected of serious terrorist
offences in custody before bringing him before a judge . . . . However,
they cannot justify . . . dispensing altogether with "prompt" judicial
control. [In the present case,] even the shortest of the four periods of
detention . . . falls outside the strict constraints as to time permitted by
the [Convention]. To attach such importance to the special features of
this case as to justify so lengthy a period of detention [four days] without
appearance before a judge or other judicial officer would . . . impair[] the
very essence of the right . . . . The undoubted fact that the arrest and
detention of the applicants were inspired by the legitimate aim of

198. All four detainees were allowed to see their solicitors after forty-eight hours, and
all refused to answer questions. The periods of detention for the other three totaled six-and
a-half, four-and-a-half, and four days, respectively. Id. 'll'll 1 1 -24.
199. European Convention on Human Rights arts. 5-l(c), supra note 174, 213 U.N.T.S.
at 5-3, 5-4.
200. Brogan, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 17, 'l! 58.
201. Id. 'll 'll 58-62.
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protecting the community as a whole from terrorism is not on its own
sufficient . . . .

Within days of the Brogan decision, the U.K. announced its hope
to comply with the ECHR judgment by establishing a procedure for
detention to be reviewed and (where appropriate) authorized by a
judge. But the government quickly concluded against involving the
courts. Its stated rationale was that detention was often based on
confidential information that could not be revealed to the suspect or
his counsel, and that allowing a court to consider information not
presented to the detainee "would represent a radical departure from
the principles which govern judicial proceedings in this country and
could seriously affect public trust and confidence in the independence
of the judiciary."202 Paradoxically, the government in effect concluded
that public trust was best furthered by maintaining a judiciary with
unvarnished independence but virtually no power to use it in this
context. It chose to respond to Brogan not by conforming to the
court's conception of "promptness" but instead by once again
invoking its derogation power.203
That step, however, simply triggered another level of ECHR
scrutiny. Two suspects arrested soon after the derogation brought suit
against the U.K. One saw his lawyer on the day of arrest and again
two days later; the other saw his solicitor only once, having been
denied access to a solicitor for the first forty-eight hours. Both were
interrogated persistently, and both were released before making any
incriminating statement - one after six and a half days, the other after
four days, six hours, and twenty-five minutes.204 Even the shorter
detention exceeded (by twenty-five minutes) a detention period held
impermissible in Brogan.
Given Brogan, the detentions obviously violated Article 5. But in
Ireland v. United Kingdom, sixteen years before, the ECHR had
upheld a far more sweeping derogation from Article 5. There was no
doubt that the Northern Ireland situation continued to represent a
"public emergency threatening the life of the nation."205 And since the
broad detention powers and slender safeguards of the earlier case
were found to be "strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation,"206 the far milder powers asserted after Brogan might have
seemed a simple matter to uphold.
202 Brannigan, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, i 32.
203. Id. at 552. The U.K. derogation was formally communicated on December 23, 1988,
approximately three weeks after Brogan had been decided. Id. i 31.
204. Id. n 10-11.
205. European Convention on Human Rights art. 15(1), supra note 174, 213 U.N.TS.
at 232.
206. Id.
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Instead, by the early 1990s, the ECHR conceptions of necessity
and judicial deference had changed. The court viewed the U.K. regime
of extra-judicial detention for seven days (a fraction of the twenty
eight-day detentions upheld in 1977) as a highly suspect departure
from rule-of-law norms, requiring the strictest scrutiny. After close
examination, the court found that the more recent and relatively
narrow U.K. detention practices, even when coupled with extensive
safeguards, just barely passed muster. It accepted that some power of
extended detention was necessary in combating terrorism. And it was
willing to defer to the U.K. government's view that in the common-law
adversarial system, the appearance of judicial independence would be
compromised if judges were in effect making decisions of an executive
nature (detention) and considering confidential information when
doing so. Finally, and decisively, the court concluded that the U.K.
derogation was tolerable only because the promptness requirement
was exceeded only by a few days and was accompanied by strong
safeguards to prevent incommunicado detention or other abuse.
The court has made clear that boundaries of this sort cannot be
stretched very far. In cases involving the Turkish government's
attempt to combat high levels of lethal terrorism in its Kurdish region,
the court held that Turkey's derogation - invoked to support a
regime of fourteen days' extra-judicial detention - was impermissible.
There was "no speedy remedy of habeas corpus," and safeguards
against incommunicado detention were insufficient because there
were "no legally enforceable rights of access to a lawyer, doctor, friend
or relative. "207 Moreover, the duration of extra-judicial detention
(fourteen days) was enough in itself to defeat the attempted
derogation and was therefore impermissible even during a "public
emergency threatening the life of the nation. "208 That "exceptionally
long" period, the court held, left the suspect unacceptably vulnerable
to arbitrary deprivation of liberty and more serious abuse. 209
In contrast, the U.K. derogation passed the test of strict necessity
because extra-judicial detention could not exceed seven days and was
well insulated against the risk of abuse. Specifically, the court found
six significant safeguards:210

207. Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553, 'JI 81 (1996).
208. European Convention on Human Rights art. 15(1), supra note 174, 213 U.N.TS.
at 232.
209. Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553, 'll 'll 78, 81 (1996); see also Sakik v. Turkey,
26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 662, 'll 'll 41-46 (1997).
210. Brannigan, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 539, 'lI'lI 62-64. Though it did not stress the point
explicitly, the Court was almost certainly influenced by the fact that authorities kept detailed
(apparently accurate) records relating to the treatment of each detainee and their
compliance with the safeguards that the court enumerated.
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- habeas corpus was available to test to lawfulness of the original
arrest;
- "detainees have an absolute and legally enforceable right to
consult a solicitor after 48 hours";
- detainees had the right to inform a friend or relative about their
detention;
- detainees had frequent access to a doctor;
- even within the first forty-eight hours, there were limits on
government power to block access to counsel; and
- in practice as well as in theory, "judicial review has been shown to
be a speedy and effective manner of ensuring that access to a
solicitor is not arbitrarily withheld" during the first forty-eight
hours.
d. Reasonable suspicion. Even when an arrestee is released within
forty-eight hours, the arrest itself is a significant deprivation of liberty.
Under the European Convention, the arrest is invalid from the outset
unless based on reasonable suspicion, and the arrestee must be
afforded the right to have "the lawfulness of his detention . . . decided
speedily by a court. "211 As interpreted by the ECHR, the
reasonableness requirement "forms an essential part of the safeguard
against arbitrary arrest and detention . . . . [A] 'reasonable suspicion'
presupposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy
an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed
the offence."212
Until 1 987, the U.K. emergency powers permitted arrest on
subjective suspicion, a clear violation of the European Convention. As
a result, suspects arrested under the emergency laws were able to
claim violations of the Convention even when they had been released
within forty-eight hours. Because no U.K. court had passed on
"reasonableness" in such cases, the ECHR had to consider that issue
de novo, and in several cases it held arrests illegal for lack of
reasonable suspicion.213 After 1987, reasonableness became a
requirement under U.K. law, but the European Court's conception of
reasonableness continued to set a standard that U.K. courts were in
effect encouraged to respect.
The ECHR decisions on "reasonableness" acknowledge several
factors placing terrorist crime in "a special category": large numbers of
lives are at risk, and police often have to use information that cannot
be revealed without putting an informant's life in jeopardy.
211. European Convention on Human Rights arts. 5-4, supra note 174, 213 U.N.T.S.
at 232.
212. Fox, Campbell & Hartley, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 157, 'II 32.
213. E.g. , Fox, Campbell & Hartley, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 157.
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Nonetheless, the European Court has largely rejected significant
departures from conventional criminal justice processes and standards
- unlike the Hamdi plurality, which seems willing to countenance
significant burden-shifting devices, proof by affidavit and military
decisionmakers.214 The European court has stressed that "the
exigencies of dealing with terrorist crime cannot justify stretching the
notion of 'reasonableness' to the point where the essence of the
safeguard secured by [the Convention] is impaired."215
Several ECHR decisions give content to this standard. Bernard
Fox, Maire Campbell and Samuel Hartley were arrested in February
and August 1986, questioned, and released after detentions lasting
forty-four hours in two cases and thirty hours in the third. Police
suspected Fox and Campbell of gathering intelligence for the IRA and
suspected Hartley of involvement in an IRA kidnapping. In the
European Court, the U.K. government noted that both Fox and
Campbell had previous convictions for explosives offenses, but beyond
those facts, the government insisted that the suspicions against all
three rested on "acutely sensitive material" that if disclosed, could
endanger informants.216
The case accordingly turned on whether hearsay and confidential
affidavits can p rovide a sufficient basis for "reasonable" suspicion.
The court acknowledged that police cannot be expected to identify
their informants; on the other hand:
(T]he Court must be enabled to ascertain whether the essence of the
safeguard afforded by (the Convention] has been secured. Consequently
the respondent Government has to furnish at least some facts or
information capable of satisfying the Court that the arrested person was
reasonably suspected of having committed the alleged offence.

Moreover,
(t]he fact that Mr Fox and Ms Campbell both have previous convictions
for acts of terrorism connected with the IRA, although it could reinforce
a suspicion linking them to the commission of terrorist-type offences,
cannot form the sole basis of a suspicion justifying their arrest in 1986,
some seven years later.217

Accordingly, the court concluded, all three arrests were illegal.
Four years later, a small difference in facts produced a different
result. Margaret Murray was arrested on suspicion of raising funds for
the IRA. She was questioned and released after a total of two hours,

214. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30. Again, however, it should be noted that
the Hamdi plurality's apparent approval of diluted safeguards was limited to the context of
battlefield seizures. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
215. Fox, Campbell & Hartley, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 157, 'lI 32.
216. Id. 'll 33.
217. Id. 'll'l! 34, 35.
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forty-five minutes of detention. She brought suit in the ECHR,
alleging that her arrest was not based on reasonable suspicion. As in
Fox, the U.K. government maintained that the suspicions against
Murray rested primarily on confidential information and could not be
disclosed without risking lives. But the government also relied on the
fact that a month before Murray's arrest, two of her brothers had been
convicted in the United States of purchasing weapons for the IRA, she
had visited the brothers there, and the circumstances of their offense
implied collaboration with "trustworthy" persons residing in Northern
Ireland.218
To frame its analysis, the court again acknowledged two competing
concerns: "the use of confidential information is essential in
combating terrorist violence," but "investigating authorities [cannot]
have carte blanche . . . free from effective control . . . whenever they
choose to assert that terrorism is involved."219 Though the court gave
"some credence"220 to the government's claim to have reliable
information, it insisted that it must be furnished "at least some
facts . . . capable of satisfying the Court."221 For a majority of the court,
the very brief duration of the detention lowered the level of suspicion
required, and the circumstances of the recent conviction of Murray's
brothers were sufficient to supply "a plausible and objective basis" for
suspicion that Murray may have been involved.222
The ECHR approach to confidential information is simultaneously
more skeptical and more permissive than that of American courts. The
European Court apparently gives confidential information, however
solid, only minimal weight and will never consider such information
sufficient by itself. But whatever weight such information does get
comes with no further probing into its nature. U.S. law is different on
both points. Under the Fourth Amendment, the weight attributed to a
confidential tip always depends on what police reveal about how the
informant acquired his information and the grounds police may have
for believing him.223 But a confidential tip backed by information
about the reliability of the informant and the basis of his knowledge
can be sufficient by itself to establish probable cause, without any
"objective" corroboration to support it.224
218. Murray, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 193, 'lI 62.
219. Id. 'lI 58.
220. Id.
221. Id. 'lI 60.
222. Id. 'lI 63. Four dissenting judges found the case indistinguishable from Fox,
Campbell & Hartley and would have ruled the arrest illegal for lack of reasonable suspicion.
223. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 233-34 (1983).
224. Id. at 232 n.7; see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412-13, 415 (1969).
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e. The ECHR Jurisprudence of Emergency Powers. In the 1970s, at
the outset of its confrontation with the U.K. measures, the ECHR
proceeded cautiously, as might be expected for a newly minted
supranational jurisdiction of uncertain authority and legitimacy. Its
early decisions were deferential and delivered long after the fact.225 It
declared that internment was unacceptable in the absence of
substantial safeguards, but then found adequate the U.K. 's early
regime of paltry protections. The European court apparently was
content to combine strong rhetoric with wishful thinking about
realities "on the ground."
Over time the court gained greater confidence, both generally and
in national-security matters. The threat of terrorism had scarcely
receded. It remained acute in Northern Ireland and had spread (for
unrelated reasons) to other countries throughout Europe. If anything,
the passage of time may have convinced the court that a "state of
emergency" had become permanent, and that unbounded judicial
deference would leave European governments with carte blanche to
suspend at will the core principles of democracy and the rule of law.
Whatever the reason, decisions from the late 1980s onward have been
increasingly bold. The court has interpreted many Convention
requirements strictly and become much less willing to take
reassurance from substitute safeguards that sound impressive on paper
but offer little in practice. As a result, the court set limits of real
significance, adding important safeguards to measures that had
already been tempered by legislative and judicial action at the national
level.
For the ECHR, no less than for the U.S. Supreme Court, it is
hazardous to attempt generalizations about the impact of judicial
precedent on practices on the ground. No doubt some ECHR rulings
were occasionally honored in the breach. On at least some of the
issues it addressed, however, the ECHR clearly did prompt real
change in the sweep of U.K. emergency powers.226 In other instances,
the availability of judicial review at the European level, with attendant
possibilities for fact-gathering and public exposure, served in itself as
some check on executive power and became an important source of
pressure to limit departures from due-process norms.

225. For example, its forceful condemnation of the "five techniques" of interrogation
came many years after the UK government permanently renounced the use of them.
226. See, for example, A verill, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 839, 851, describing U.K. government
actions to cure violations of Convention right-to-counsel requirements. See generally CONOR
A. GEARTY, The United Kingdom, in EUROPEAN CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 53, 85-86, 101-103 (Conor A.
Gearty ed., 1997) (discussing substantive legal change implemented in twenty out of the
twenty-two instances in which the Committee of Ministers had concluded that such change
was required).
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In previous national emergencies, U.S. courts diluted normal
judicial checks to a considerable degree. Nonetheless, they refused to
condone executive action supplanting the essence of judicial review on
matters pertaining to detention, particularly the detention of civilians
and those claiming to be civilians.227 Confronted by acute
contemporary threats of terrorism, both Britain and Israel likewise
granted executive and military authorities some extraordinary powers
but preserved a system of effective checks on the executive and the
assurance of prompt, fully independent judicial review.
In the current "war on terrorism,'' however, the U.S. government
has claimed emergency powers that exceed by very large margins indeed, by light years - the executive powers accepted as necessary
and legitimate in Britain and Israel. Addressing measures far more
cautious than those deployed by our own government, courts
nonetheless struck down the executive and military actions as
unacceptable erosions of necessary checks and balances.
The fact that other nations reached such conclusions, and indeed
that our own courts did so in previous national emergencies, cannot by
itself refute empirical claims about the supposed effectiveness of
greater executive power and the supposed need for fewer judicial
checks. We can be confident, however, that contrary to conventional
wisdom, the emergency powers the U.S. government now claims and that the Hamdi plurality seems prepared to accept - are not
normal, even for a situation of national crisis. The question which
remains unanswered, and which defenders of present U.S. policy have
considered unnecessary even to address, is why there would be
sufficient reason to abandon the wartime checks and balances that we
ourselves, along with other Western democracies, have until now
considered an essential component of the rule of law.

227. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44. Even the Court's infamous, now
discredited Korernatsu decision authorized only removal of Japanese-Americans from
designated areas on the West Coast, while the Court simultaneously - the same day - held
that holding them in detention was illegal. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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APPENDIX: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON H UMAN RIGHTS

The European Convention addresses the central criminal
procedure concerns of the American Bill of Rights, often in similar
language. Several clauses are less protective than their American
counterparts; others are more protective.228 But a crucial difference
from the U.S. Constitution is the Convention system for
accommodating law-enforcement and national-security needs. Our
requirement of "due process" invites some balancing of interests, as
does our Fourth Amendment, which prohibits only "unreasonable"
searches and seizures. Most other commands of the U.S. Constitution
are nominally absolute.
In contrast, the European Convention elaborately defines the
allowable domain of what we call "balancing." It uses two distinct
mechanisms - necessity exceptions and formal derogations. Necessity
can limit the right to privacy and the freedoms of speech, religion and
assembly.229 Exceptions for necessity are precluded - but formal
derogations remain available - for the right to fair trial and the
protections against unjust arrest and detention.
The room for derogation is hardly surprising; it is exactly what we
would expect to find, directly or indirectly, in any bill of rights. The
novelty of the European Convention's derogation mechanism is
twofold. First, Article 15(2) prohibits derogation from certain
especially fundamental obligations, e.g. the prohibitions on torture,
inhuman or degrading treatment, ex post facto laws, double jeopardy,
and the death penalty. Contrary to what we might expect, law
enforcement and national-security emergencies cannot qualify or limit
the scope of these prohibitions.230 Second, even in areas where the
228. For example, the Convention grants no right to a jury trial, and indigents have a
right to free counsel only "when the interests of justice so require," European Convention
on Human Rights arts. 6-3(c), supra note 174, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, but unlike our Eighth
Amendment, the Convention expressly prohibits the death penalty in peacetime. Protocol 6
to the European Convention on Human Rights, Apr. 28, 1983, arts. 1-2, 1496 U.N.T.S. 281.
229. For example, the right to privacy can be impaired only when "necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety, or the economic well
being of the country, for the prevention or disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." European Convention on
Human Rights art. 8, supra note 174, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230. As interpreted by the ECHR,
"democratic" is not equivalent to "majoritarian"; a "democratic" society means one in which
the majority proceeds with care whenever its actions may affect personal rights that the
Convention identifies as central to the dignity and flourishing of the individual. E.g., local v.
Turkey, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 449, 480 (1998). Viewing democracy in this way, the ECHR will
consider a restriction "necessary in a democratic society" only if it meets a "pressing" need
and is "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued." Id. at 481.
230. European Convention on Human Rights art. 15(2), supra note 174, 213 U.N.T.S.
at 232; Protocol 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights art. 3, supra note 228,
1496 U.N.T.S. at 281; Protocol 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights, Nov.
22, 1984, art. 4(3), 1525 U.N.T.S. 195, 196; Protocol 13 to the European Convention
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European Convention permits derogation, Article 15 circumscribes
that power and subjects it to oversight by the European Court:
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from
the obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. . . .

3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation

shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed
of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. . . .

Multiple restrictions are packed into this language. The
requirement of formal notification and explanation to the Council of
Europe provides a procedural and political check. And the substantive
limits are significant. First, even serious law-enforcement exigencies
are insufficient to trigger the derogation power; the emergency must
be sufficiently grave to threaten the life of the nation. Second, even an
overwhelming emergency of this sort does not by itself suspend
Convention obligations. Nor does such an emergency - one that
threatens the life of the nation - require automatic deference to the
necessity judgments of military or executive authorities. When the life
of a nation is threatened, the European Convention still preserves a
judicial checking function to assure that steps taken are "strictly
required" in the judgment of the independent officials (mostly
nationals of other countries) who sit as judges of the European
Court.231
Absent a valid derogation, the Convention requires detention and
trial to meet detailed requirements. In both civil and criminal cases,
Article 6 grants the right to a "fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal." In
criminal cases Article 6 adds a presumption of innocence and grants
the accused the rights to notice of the charges, assistance of counsel,
and the ability to call and cross-examine witnesses.232
on Human Rights, May 3, 2002, art. 2, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/
webConvenENG.pdf.
231 . Each signatory state in effect nominates one judge. See European Convention on
Human Rights art. 22, supra note 174, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236.
232. Specifically, Article 6 grants the accused the rights:
. . . [to] be presumed innocent until proved guilty. . . .
. . . to be informed promptly . . . and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation . . . ;
to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; to defend himself in
person or through (counsel] of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means . . . , to be
given (legal assistance] free when the interests of justice so require; to examine and have
examined witnesses against him and to obtain . . . witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him . . . .

Id. at 228.
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Article 5 limits the purposes for which detention may be ordered.
The allowable purposes are broad but, unlike our Constitution, do not
include any potentially legitimate state interest. Detention is
permissible to prevent the spread of infectious diseases; "for the
purpose of bringing [a person] before the competent legal authority on
reasonable suspicion of committing an offense . . . "; to permit
deportation or extradition; and "when it is reasonably considered
necessary to prevent [the person from] committing an offense." The
list of valid purposes is constrained by the prerequisite of judicially
testable "reasonableness," and it has one significant omission:
detention is not permissible simply for purposes of interrogation.233
Detention for a valid purpose must respect a detainee's rights to be
informed promptly of the reasons for detention; to have the lawfulness
of the detention decided speedily by a court; and to have release
ordered if the detention is unlawful. Individuals detained as suspected
offenders or for preventive detention have the additional right to be
tried within a reasonable time or released pending trial. These norms,
and the existence of a supra-national jurisdiction to enforce them,
imposed an additional layer of constraints on British counter
terrorism measures in Northern Ireland.

233. Investigators seeking to interrogate of course can invoke one of the allowed
purposes as the basis for detaining their target. But an allowable purpose will in turn trigger
its own requirements. Thus, if the detention is ostensibly based on suspicion of having
committed an offense, Article 5(1) requires that the suspicion be reasonable and subject to
prompt review by a court. Id. at 228.

